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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the time of Socrates, the idea of love and the conception of the human heart have 
been devalued by thinkers who, by definition, are known as “lovers of wisdom.”  Considered 
pejoratively as “the passions,” the subject of emotion was deemed inferior to thought centered upon 
the human faculty of reason. Many studies in the sciences, from biology to psychology, claim to 
have pointed us to the source of the human experience of love—but do they help us to understand 
love properly? In order to provide a full consideration of love in my philosophical research, I will 
focus my analysis on love under the philosophical lens of phenomenology. Known as the study of 
firsthand human experience, phenomenology became the influential school of thought for many 
German philosophers in the early twentieth century. My research will closely examine the writings of 
Max Scheler, Dietrich von Hildebrand, and Jean-Luc Marion within the context of this tradition. 
Moving from a justification of love in philosophy to the topic of self-love, I hope to define 
effectively what it means to love another. I shall also attempt to disambiguate the common 
assumptions regarding the nature of love. Is there a fundamental difference between the 
phenomenon of “falling in love” and of love itself? I question whether love,  in its essence,  is 
defined by the element of choice—of a willful emotional giving of oneself to another—and whether 
it can be distinguished from a passive feeling and an active loving will. I aim to bring the human 
affective sphere into the full light of philosophical inquiry, considering whether love is a moral act of 
the will that involves a total participation of the self—in mind, body, and spirit. Love is arguably the 
most powerful of the human emotions, one that elevates the human sphere of emotions and the 
ethical existence beyond simple desire. As I hope to show, a philosophical study of love is highly 
relevant today, since the sciences have not adequately answered the perennial question: What is love?  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
What is the nature of love, and how should it properly be spoken of in philosophical 
discourse? The meaning of the word philosophy is derived from two Greek words, philo meaning love, 
and sophia meaning wisdom, and yet the particular nature of the phenomenon of love has been a 
question neglected, ironically, by philosophers—those considered by definition to be lovers of 
wisdom. For many, love is a private topic of discussion, a notion that is so personal it is often passed 
over in silence. It is often left for the artists—the poets, painters, and musicians—but do they help 
us to properly understand love? Some consider the topic as belonging to the realm of the ineffable, 
an emotion that is in essence so subjective that it is left unquestioned, cast aside to make room for 
other philosophical matters. Many disagree as to the nature of love, whether there is a fundamental 
reality, and even argue that love itself is a human construct. Can there be one fruitful definition of 
love great enough to satisfy the human appetite for knowledge of the heart’s deepest emotion? In 
order to address these questions in the deepest sense, I shall consider the love primarily under the 
philosophical lens of phenomenology, a way of knowing that will be particularly helpful in grasping 
love’s essence. This work will attempt to bring the concept of love into the full light of philosophical 
inquiry through exploring the possibility of a unified philosophy of love. 
Multiple studies in the sciences, from biology to psychology, claim to have pointed us to the 
source of the human experience of love. Yet the biological explanation of what truly constitutes the 
human experience of love may have fallen short of a thorough answer. Although a basic empirical 
understanding of human love is valuable in our pursuit of knowledge, philosophy essentially picks 
up where empirical study—in both neurology and psychology—leave off. I shall nonetheless 
consider reductionistic or naturalistic explanations as to what constitutes love—from biological 
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theories of attraction and attachment, to the psychoanalytic conception posed by Freud—in order to 
discover what limitations there are with this view from a philosophical perspective. As I hope to 
show, a philosophical study of love is relevant even today, since science has yet to properly satisfy 
our appetite for answers to the essential, perennial question: What is love? 
Since the time of Socrates, the status of love and the conception of the human heart have 
been devalued, deemed supremely inferior to the human faculty of reason. Plato’s conception of the 
soul devalues the human affective sphere, otherwise known as “the heart.” Although love has often 
been overshadowed by other intellectual pursuits in the history of ideas, many profound visions of 
love can be found in philosophical works, which may provide answers to these myriad questions of 
love. 
One way of achieving this goal is to consider the argument that love is, to some degree, an 
“ethical art’” a notion that should be explored, in theory and practice, to properly address the central 
question of philosophy established by the ancients, which is, “How should we live the good life?”  
Socrates, a proclaimed expert in the ‘art of erotics,’ spoke about love in the sense of both erôs and 
erôtan—love is both an expression of passion and of conversational inquiry. Is love thus best 
understood as an emotion, an ethic, a way of life?  Does loving require—or at least seek—an 
understanding of the beloved, and does love grow inextricably with knowledge? Beyond merely 
abstract reasoning, viewing love as a moral task elevates it from emotion to action in the life and 
social sphere of an individual. I shall argue that love is necessarily a moral act, as it occurs between 
two human persons and is an act that involves a total participation of the self. 
The nature of love has been explored by many thinkers since the time of Socrates, but it is 
with the advent of the phenomenological tradition that an exciting new way to explore the nature of 
love was opened. Conceived by German philosopher Edmund Husserl, the tradition of 
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phenomenology took root in the early twentieth century thought of the Munich and Gottingen 
circles. Phenomenology, the study of firsthand human experience, became the influential school of 
thought for Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand in the twentieth century. Scheler’s Nature of 
Sympathy, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, and Ordo Amoris provide a 
phenomenology of the emotions and a profound ethical analysis of the human affective sphere that 
influenced thought a century late, and von Hildebrand provides a thorough account of the human 
affective sphere, the heart, and its most powerful and misunderstood spiritual emotion—love—in 
his works The Nature of Love and The Heart. A contemporary of Scheler, von Hildebrand’s philosophy 
complements Scheler’s theory of emotions and offers an account that takes the philosophical inquiry 
even further. Looking at the most recent work in the phenomenology of love, Jean-Luc Marion’s 
The Erotic Phenomenon continues the thread of thought drawn from Husserl in examining the erotic 
intentionality of human love. These works will be examined in detail below. 
Both Scheler’s phenomenological “order of love” outlined in the essay Ordo Amoris and 
Kierkegaard’s espousal of love’s duty in his Works of Love serve as two perspectives central to this 
study that represent the dichotomy between theory and practice. This view of love as both 
conceptual theory and ethical practice arguably best helps in understanding the nature of love, and 
its normative value that can transcend the self in the social sphere to cultivate a more loving attitude 
in the world. Throughout my thesis, I shall attempt to disambiguate the common assumptions 
regarding the notion of love, and through extensive research from I shall seek an answer as to 
whether or not a unified conception of love exists. By closely studying the works of Scheler and von 
Hildebrand within the context of the phenomenological tradition, I will be able to thoroughly 
examine my philosophical question in all its complexity and richness.  
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I shall begin my thesis with an exploration of the heart in Chapter One, for the sphere of 
affectivity forms the basis of Scheler and von Hildebrand’s conceptions of love. I discuss the role of 
the heart in the history of Western philosophy in the first chapter, examining the role of subjectivity 
and will in our affective response to others. In Chapter Two I will begin a discussion of love’s 
ontology, that is, to explore the being of love, to establish the claim that love is objectively real—
beyond the realm of merely subjective feeling that many scientific studies suggest—and is worth a 
consideration as an intrinsically moral act. In Chapter Three I will examine Scheler’s phenomenology 
of emotions, outlining the stratification of the emotional life and the formation of the human 
person. One of the assumptions I shall analyze in Chapter Four is that in order to love, one must 
first love oneself. I shall focus on an exploration of the love of self, seeking to uncover whether or 
not self-love exists, and to question whether a phenomenology of emotions provides insight into the 
love of self.  
In Chapter Five I shall attempt to determine the nature of love for the other, and consider 
how it may also manifest itself in authentic and inauthentic forms in Chapter Seven. Providing the 
reader with an account of love’s phenomenology within Scheler’s Ordo Amoris, I question whether a 
working concept of “proper,” “ideal,” or “authentic” love in the normative sense can be uncovered 
in his work. I anticipate juxtaposing views of love that differ in terms of a passive and active sense. The 
idea of love in the passive sense embodies the character of love in its primal nature. That which is ruled 
by passive feeling we have no control over; the passive sense encompasses the notion of falling in 
love, the Kierkegaardian idea of the “first love” and the rule of passion that befalls us. The initial 
instance of love, with regard to the notions of temporality, caprice, feeling, and other conditional 
senses of love’s experience, falls within the sphere of passivity. This passive aspect of love stands in 
contrast to love in an active sense, one which is inscribed by will and, ultimately, stems from a sense of 
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duty to love one’s neighbor as oneself. I differentiate between these phenomena of love as “falling in 
love” (passive) and “choosing to love” (active). As I expect to demonstrate, the essence of love goes 
beyond the merely subjectively passive experience, and into the transcendent and active ethic of 
choice. I shall argue that the human experience of actual “love” is an active emotion with an element 
of choice. The role of choice in love is a distinctive phenomenon of the human experience of love. 
The element of choice is a prominent feature of our human capacity for love, one that takes us 
beyond the sphere purely sensual feeling toward a higher ethic of loving. That love in essence is 
defined by this distinctive element of choice, of a willful emotional giving of oneself to another 
serves ultimately to distinguish the passive loving feeling from the active loving will.  
I shall finally question whether or not, within the nature of love, a normative ideal, proper 
order, or authentic phenomenon of love leads one toward communion with the other, a love which 
goes beyond the self toward edification and unification with others. I shall further explore in 
Chapter Four the relation between love and knowledge to examine the correlation between 
understanding and loving, which one, if either, precedes the other, to discover how the interplay of 
love and knowledge can transform one’s love for another. Love is arguably the most powerful of the 
human emotions, one that elevates the human sphere of emotions and the ethical existence beyond 
the self. It is a force that compels individuals toward a greater existence, not only for oneself or 
one’s neighbor, but for many, love drives one toward a compassionate attitude in life. With a basic 
understanding of the fundamentals of love, it will be the task of the reader, or the lover, to put into 
practice his or her understanding of love as it relates to the human striving of “the good life.” 
 
Beyond these readings involving my research I wish to acknowledge some of the teachers 
who have been indispensable in my philosophical journey. I wish to acknowledge Dr. Nam Nguyen, 
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the first teacher to introduce me to philosophy. My mentor, my teacher, and my friend, Dr. Nguyen 
placed my very first readings on love in my hands when I was a freshman, a chapter on love from M. 
Scott Peck’s work, The Road Less Traveled. It was at this moment I realized that in matters of love, I 
had a great deal to learn. Our conversations inside and outside of class initially sparked my inquiry 
on the meaning of love, and continue to challenge me today, both academically and personally. 
I wish to recognize the debt of gratitude I owe to my research mentor, Dr. Michael Strawser. 
He has guided, enhanced, and challenged my research questions on the nature of love since my first 
class with him on the philosophy of love in the Spring of 2010. Without his support and guidance, 
my projects, travels, grants, and presentations would not have been possible. Without his dedication, 
I would not be where I am today in my understanding of key philosophical concepts in our field.  
 Furthermore, I wish to acknowledge my personal communication with scholars in 
philosophy that I have encountered outside of my university. During my stay at the Hong 
Kierkegaard Library at St. Olaf College in the Summer of 2011, the many office hour conversations 
with Kierkegaard scholar and library curator Gordon Marino helped guide and focus my research. 
Dr. Marino provided much-needed advice for advancing the development of my ideas and 
furthering my understanding of Kierkegaard’s thoughts on love. For the past year, Franciscan 
University professor, von Hildebrand scholar and translator of The Nature of Love, Dr. John F. 
Crosby has enriched my philosophical understanding of love. In continuing my correspondence with 
Dr. Crosby, I have exchanged ideas on the philosophy of love and von Hildebrand’s work, and he 
has given me guidance and suggestions on improving my research. He provided me with an 
unpublished chapter of the English translation of von Hildebrand’s work Aesthetics, which brings a 
deeper comprehension and appreciation of his thoughts on value-response and the essential 
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connection between love and beauty. Dr. Crosby also provided me with resources—from articles to 
his own philosophical lectures—which aren’t readily available to students at my university.  
 Another scholar integral to my discovery of von Hildebrand is the founder of the Dietrich 
von Hildebrand Legacy Project and co-translator of The Nature of Love, John Henry Crosby. During 
my stay at the Legacy Project’s headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia, I was allowed access to a myriad 
of invaluable resources, sharing Mr. Crosby’s wealth of personal and academic knowledge of both 
Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand through our conversations during my stay. To these men 
and many others I owe my gratitude for keeping the love of wisdom alive in philosophical discourse 
today—a task I seek to enhance in this thesis. 
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To feel for none is the true social art 
of the world's stoics — men without a heart. 
Lord Byron 
 
Chapter One: The Role of the Affective Sphere 
 
For centuries, many philosophers have defined the human person as ens cogitans—a thinking 
being. Two contemporaries within the German phenomenological tradition, Max Scheler and 
Dietrich von Hildebrand began, instead, from the conception of humans as ens amans—loving 
beings. Deeply imbedded within their works is the primacy of the heart. Why did each thinker begin 
from this philosophical standpoint? Why the heart? This chapter will explore the role of the heart in 
the philosophy of love in the works of Scheler and Hildebrand. 
While teaching in Germany, both philosophers were colleagues and close friends, writing in 
many areas with coinciding interests. How closely are their ideas on love interrelated? An eminently 
important aspect in their philosophies can be seen in “the pride of place” given to the affective 
sphere.1 Elevating the role of human emotion in philosophy, both Scheler and von Hildebrand have 
formulated a phenomenology that places love at the center of man and the philosophical task. 
Through examining von Hildebrand’s key philosophical works, including The Nature of Love and The 
Heart, and Scheler’s The Nature of Sympathy, I will uncover how Scheler and von Hildebrand’s work in 
the phenomenology of emotions may help us understand the phenomenon of love. 
 
                                                     
1 John Henry Crosby, "Introduction to Dietrich von Hildebrand's Mozart: Dietrich von Hildebrand  
in His Unknown Role as Master Phenomenologist of Art," Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 7, no. 2 (2004): 
176. 
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The Heart in Western Philosophy 
Since the ancient era, philosophers have generally privileged the human faculty of reason, 
logos, over that of emotion, pathos. Many of these philosophers maintain that “our passions and our 
feelings are unnecessary to the search for truth about any matter whatever. What is more, feelings 
can easily impede that search, either by distracting the searching intellect, or, still worse, by distorting 
its view of the world.”2 Such an attitude has been prevalent for centuries. An idea held by many 
philosophers is that to involve the affective sphere is to “move the passions, and thereby mislead the 
judgment.”3 It should be no surprise that philosophy has remained historically silent on the topic of 
love, as: 
The secondary place assigned to the sphere of affectivity and to the heart has remained, 
strangely enough, a more or less noncontroversial part of our philosophical heritage. The 
entire affective sphere was for the most part subsumed under the heading of passions, and as 
long as one dealt with it expressly under this title, its irrational and nonspiritual character was 
emphasized.4 
 
This betrayal of matters of the heart is reinforced by Western thought since the time of ancient 
philosophers. The heart—and its associated affective activities—has been discussed and dismissed in 
ways that diminish general attitudes toward a relevant aspect of what it means to be human. I wish 
to argue however that the human affective sphere is not only a subject for philosophical exploration; 
it is a vital topic of inquiry that leads us to a greater understanding of love, and ultimately, unlocks 
the nature of the human person. 
The neglect of the heart hearkens back to ancient Athens, as “the Aristotelian position 
                                                     
2 Martha Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 262-263. 
3 Ibid., 263. 
4 Dietrich von Hildebrand, The Heart (Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2007), 3. 
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towards this sphere unequivocally testifies to a disparagement of the heart.”5 Von Hildebrand 
explains that, according to Aristotle’s concept of the soul, “the intellect and the will belong to the 
rational part of man; the affective realm, and with it the heart, belong to the irrational part in man, 
that is, to the area of experience which man allegedly shares with animals.”6 This sentiment has only 
evolved to damage the merit of the heart throughout the history of philosophy. Returning to the 
ancient conception of love in philosophy, “it is true that we find in Plato’s Phaedrus the words, ‘the 
madness of love is the greatest of heaven’s blessings,’” von Hildebrand writes, “but when it comes 
to a systematic classification of man’s capacities (as in the Republic), Plato did not grant to the heart a 
rank comparable to that of the intellect.”7 This places our discussion at a point of contention, which 
both Scheler and von Hildebrand address in asking us: what can be more essential to man than love?  
The bias toward the cognitive faculty in experience throughout the history of philosophy is 
on the decline, as many phenomenological thinkers have brought intellectual attention to the 
experiential and moral value of emotions. As this work develops, it will become clear how both 
Scheler and von Hildebrand were committed to “rehabilitating the dignity of the affections”8 in 
their works of phenomenology. According to John Drummond, “Our ordinary experience from the 
beginning encompasses cognitive and affective—and, I might add, practical—dimensions.”9 It is 
natural, even necessary to consider both the cognitive and affective elements of human experience, as 
it is clear that both “things and situations affect us; they evoke feelings in us.”10 To divorce the 
                                                     
5 Dietrich von Hildebrand, The Heart, 3. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 John Henry Crosby, “Mozart,” 176. 
9 John J. Drummond, “Feelings, Emotions, and Wertnehmungen” (invited plenary address at the meeting of the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für phänomenologische Forschung, September 30–October 3, 2009), 1-2. 
10 Ibid., 2. 
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affective from philosophical inquiry would be to provide an incomplete picture of reality: “The 
phenomenologist…must describe how a world filled with physical, affective, practical, and cultural 
significance is disclosed by any experiencing subject.”11 We cannot reduce the meaning of what is 
human to one aspect of our soul or personality. Our world is filled with many elements, from the 
affective to the rational. To deny the importance of one aspect of our approach to reality is to deny 
the fullness of our experience of reality.12 Von Hildebrand retained this attitude throughout his life, 
and “considered the implied standard of emotional detachment and affective neutrality to be 
tantamount to an inauthentic form of objectivity.”13 
Men without Chests 
 
The Vienna Circle—a distinct group of intellectuals in the 20th century—began a dialogue 
that sought to expunge philosophy’s contemplative endeavors of all metaphysical notions, including 
any talk of love or the heart. In an attempt to achieve a scientific world-conception as close to the 
“truth” as language would allow, branches from the philosophical tree were broken off with the 
intellectual force of positivism. The movement was an effort to achieve the utmost clarity and 
concision in the work of philosophy, comparative to the scientific achievements at the time. Even 
philosophers could not ignore the intellectual successes of the scientific community, which included 
thinkers from Helmholtz to Einstein. Many wished to achieve a standard of philosophy that reached 
                                                     
11 Drummond, “Feelings, Emotions, and Wertnehmungen,” 3. 
12 This is a hallmark move of von Hildebrand away from his teacher Husserl (who desired an atheist phenomenology): 
The phenomenological approach is not… restricted to the philosophical analysis of genuine essences, that is, to 
philosophical a priori knowledge. It is also indispensable for the deeper understanding of man data which play 
a predominant role in the humanities, such as a great individual personality, or the cultural epoch baroque, or 
an individual work of art (What Is Philosophy? Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1973). 
Furthermore, the discrepancy between Husserl’s philosophical idealism seriously conflicted with von Hildebrand’s 
phenomenological realist leanings such that, upon von Hildebrand’s completion of his graduate work, Husserl denied his 
student a post-graduate recommendation due to the Catholic influence on his philosophy. 
13 John Henry Crosby, “Mozart,” 176. 
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a level of accuracy on par with the hard sciences. Such philosophical disciplines expelled by the 
positivists included the pursuit of metaphysics, aesthetics, and ethics.  
Many philosophers of his thread of thought attack the emotive and impassioned aspects of 
the written word, and presuppose that these features are irrelevant to the “grasp of truth,” rendering 
them unspeakable in the whole of philosophy. For some, philosophers who approach ideas, objects, 
or others with an “intuitive” way of knowing are disregarded by the many philosophers who “have 
in fact forsaken love, dismissed it without a concept and finally thrown it to the dark and worried 
margins of their sufficient reason—along with the repressed, the unsaid, the unmentionable.”14 Yet 
for these purely cerebral men, as C.S. Lewis warns us, “their heads are no bigger than the ordinary: it 
is the atrophy of the chest beneath that makes them seem so.”15 As we shall see, the human heart 
can fall into affective atrophy—a loss of one’s connection with emotional affectivity—and this trend of 
thought may be a result of philosophical “affective atrophy” that befell those philosophers overruled 
by the faculty of reason. Perhaps positivism is what C. S. Lewis was referring to in his essay The 
Abolition of Man; the contemporary positivists are the “men without chests.” 
The reverberations of the positivist movement can still be felt in the tradition of philosophy 
today. It is echoed in the response of those of the school of Wittgenstein who hold steadfastly to the 
seventh proposition in the Tractatus: “Whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent.”16 The 
mention of the emotions—from the sphere of affectivity to love— often falls on deaf ears in 
philosophical discourse. Perhaps Marion is correct in saying that “this silence is for the better, 
                                                     
14 Jean-Luc Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 1. 
15 C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man, or, Reflections on Education with Special Reference to the Teaching of English in the Upper Forms 
of Schools (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 25. 
16 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1922), 27. 
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because when philosophy does venture to speak of love it mistreats or betrays it.”17 The aim of this 
work, beyond seeking clarity on the hazy notion of love in philosophy, is to serve as a clarion call to 
philosophers that emotion is not only a valid, but necessary topic of exploration.  
C.S. Lewis reminds us that, “without the aid of trained emotions the intellect is powerless 
against the animal organism.”18 We are not speaking of “emotion” in the strictly Platonic sense, as 
unrestrained passion, but of emotion as a sanctioned center of affectivity. I speak of “emotion” as 
not a fleeting physiological response to an object, but of emotion as representative of an entire 
spectrum of human feeling, ascending from simple sensual response (pleasure/pain) to complex 
spiritual response (love/hatred). The sensual or vital level of feeling is simple in the sense of its non-
intentionality: there is no object of such feeling-states, no specific response to a specific external 
object at this level of feeling. This lies in contrast to emotions of intentionality; in reference to 
‘intentional,’ “we refer to a conscious, rational relation between the person and an object.”19 For 
both von Hildebrand and Scheler “intentionality is a mark of the higher, spiritual part of man, 
distinguishing it from the lower irrational part.”20  
What it means to be human cannot be reduced to the material, through studies in science or 
psychology. Missing from these studies is the ontological level—a consideration of the heart. The 
scientific type of knowledge is acquired by a “seeing from without,” an empirical way of gathering 
facts of the world. Throughout his work, von Hildebrand sought to clarify the difference between 
scientific seeing “from without” to philosophic seeing “from within.”  The nature of love deals with 
not just the physical—the measurable view from without that psychosomatic studies seek to explain, 
                                                     
17 Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 1. 
18 Lewis, The Abolition of Man, 24. 
19 Dietrich Von Hildebrand, Ethics (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1972), 191. 
20 Ibid., 217. 
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but the metaphysical—the realm beyond purely physical appearance—which is accessed by a sight 
from within, from the spiritual center of man, from the heart.  
The Tenor of the Heart 
 
Throughout this work I have explained that the heart is the center of affectivity, the spiritual 
center of the self. What is the overall significance of the heart in the experience of the human 
person? The primary goal of this section is to delineate the significance of love, which is “the voice 
of the heart, an affective response, indeed the most affective of all responses.”21 The heart is 
responsible for the human range of emotions, hence why the term sphere of affectivity is the 
philosophical equivalent of the more poetic, metaphoric heart. This center of affectivity is given a 
place of importance in the phenomenology of von Hildebrand and his value-realist counterpart, 
teacher, and friend Scheler. Both philosophers recognize the limitations of the Platonic conception 
of emotions. Although Scheler vehemently elevates affectivity above the other faculties, emotion, 
volition, and cognition hold an equal rank in the formation of man for von Hildebrand.  
The sphere of affectivity is responsible for emotions simple and complex, the highest and 
most powerful of which being love and hatred. With the human response to emotions, are hearts are 
actualized, and we are moved, affected by the object, person, event, and so on. According to von 
Hildebrand “this actualization of the center of the value response, “the charitable, reverent, humble 
center,” excludes the simultaneous actualization of the center from which hate, envy, and revenge 
derive.”22 If love and hatred are the highest powers of the heart, it follows that there is on only 
“space” for one eminently powerful value response in the heart at one time. We cannot 
simultaneously love and hate an individual. How can humans gain control of their affectivity? How 
                                                     
21 Dietrich von Hildebrand, The Nature of Love (Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 2009), 54. 
22 Von Hildebrand, Ethics, 409. 
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can it be possible to allow love to descend into hatred; how can we allow love to transfigure hate? A 
full consideration of the relation between love and hatred is beyond the scope of this work. Let us 
now consider the role of the will in the vale responses in the heart. 
 If emotions are indeed, according to von Hildebrand, on par with, and not subservient to 
reason or the will, how does he reconcile the power of human affectivity? On this point, let us look 
at von Hildebrand’s view on the relation between love—the voice of the heart—and will: 
One cannot deny that love is not free in the same sense as the will is free. We cannot give 
ourselves love even if we want to. It is not in our power freely to posit such a response of 
the heart like we can posit a response of the will, nor is it in our power to command love like 
an action. Between the mere will to love someone and real love for that person there is an 
abyss. 23 
 
The spontaneity of love, the freedom of the value-response is retained in von Hildebrand’s 
interpretation of volition. We are free to love, but we are not free to force our heart to respond to 
another in love. He preserves the voice of the heart as a personal recognition of the other, the 
“tenor of the heart” in the sense of love as being a response to value. Von Hildebrand indeed 
acknowledges the difference between the heart’s free response to the other—love as value 
response—and the command to love others as a neighbor—love as willed ethic. The theme of this 
work is the former. This response does not arise from will or intellect, but from the heart: 
Even if one were blind to the role of love in human life, it is still true that whether one 
considers the main source of earthly happiness to be beauty, knowledge, or creative work, 
the experience of happiness is something affective, for it is the heart that experiences 
happiness, and not the intellect or the will.24 
 
The will does not respond to value, nor does it serve as the voice of the heart. The value response of 
love lies in the recognition of the heart. In his emphasis on spontaneity and freedom in the response 
of the heart, von Hildebrand does not intend to relegate his personalist concept of love to a purely 
                                                     
23 Von Hildebrand, The Nature of Love, 54. 
24 Von Hildebrand, The Heart, 17. 
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free, unsanctioned response of the heart. He means to point to the approach to the other in love as 
motivated not through a willing, but by a giving, for “the commitment of the heart is that is proper 
to love is not a result of the will but a gift.”25 The dignity of love as an affective response lies not in 
its willing extension to the other, but in spontaneous givenness. For von Hildebrand, value and gift 
are thematic elements proper to love, not duty. What value, what insight can we glean from the 
heart’s response when it is strictly a willed ethic?  
On this point—the role of the will in love—we can immediately separate von Hildebrand’s 
value phenomenology from Kantian deontology, and even the Thomist approach to love. For love 
qua love cannot merely be willed into action to retain the dignity of the value response to the other 
qua person: 
Whoever loves realizes that this love is not really returned as long as the other person only 
has the will to love him but without any involvement of the heart. If the other does not 
yearn for our presence and is not delighted by it and made happy by it, if his heart does not 
speak, then he does not love us, even if he makes the greatest effort of will to love.”26 
 
Love is not will; collapsing the two in an attempt to properly identify love is equivocation. Although 
human affectivity is a valid motivation for love, this is not to be confused with sentimentality, sort of 
aesthetic stirring of the emotions for the sake of feeling itself. Sentimentality is a form of emotional 
aestheticism, “a merry-go-round of the heart which spins only to spin again.”27 
Von Hildebrand cautions of the danger of “men without chests,” individuals who forsake 
the tenor of the heart out of a fear or disdain for emotion. This leads to a closing-off, a hardening of 
the heart that severely limits not only our understanding of the other, but our experience of the 
world. Such a person “avoid[s] the unique surrender of his heart and of the entire rhythm of his life. 
                                                     
25 Von Hildebrand, The Nature of Love, 54. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Fulton Sheen, Three to Get Married, 6. 
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His is an attitude which…also resists any total love in which one gives one’s heart.”28 The 
hardening of one’s heart points to “the lack of freedom that comes from remaining stuck in one’s 
subjectivity and being too preoccupied with one’s interests. By being preoccupied like this, one cuts 
oneself off in a sense from the objective logos, from the rhythm of the world of values, and from 
one’s neighbor.”29 The heart is key to opening up our subjectivity—our Eigenleben—in order to 
enter communion with others.  
In opening up our hearts, how can our affectivity change our response to others? Under 
what conditions of the heart are we led to respond to others with love or hatred? Perhaps we can say 
that an individual with a strong Eigenleben is more receptive to the value of others, more engaged in 
the intersubjective, I-Thou communion that will open our hearts to recognize “the charitable, 
reverent, humble center”30 of others. Perhaps a “withered” Eigenleben can inhibit our ability to 
respond to others with love. Considering the role of the will in love, can we say that our love 
overpowers our hatred with the sanction of the will? Perhaps hatred, if we allow it to, can also 
overpower love. The next section will touch on a historical example of hardened affectivity and its 
effects on the individual and society, exemplified in the affective atrophy of Germans under 
National Socialism. I will consider the consequences of von Hildebrand’s rehabilitation of the heart, 
the effect of opening up our affectivity to others. 
Rehabilitation of the Heart 
 
In his time, von Hildebrand took upon himself the task of reminding us of the importance 
of the heart in a time when “many were oppressed by the mechanical and artificial rationality that 
                                                     
28 Von Hildebrand, The Nature of Love, 54. 
29 Ibid., 217. 
30 Von Hildebrand, Ethics, 409. 
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dominate[d] modern life.”31 Living in European society during the rise of National Socialism, von 
Hildebrand knew that his people “were longing to get beyond this sterile rationality and to 
participate in forms of life that were more abundant and organic.”32 Von Hildebrand’s philosophy 
has an undoubtedly personalist element in his emphasis on the meaning of subjectivity in the 
philosophical task. The unique status of the human person is eminently important to the task of the 
philosopher, whether it is discovering the nature of reality or the nature of love. Throughout his life 
as an academic, von Hildebrand vehemently pronounced the necessity of valuing the human 
person.33 Von Hildebrand saw the inherent dangers of Nazism, and “was quick to detect an 
opening for the anti-personalism of the age.”34 John F. Crosby shares his view on von Hildebrand’s 
emphasis on value and the importance of our subjective response to value. He claims that, for von 
Hildebrand, “what is authentically personal cannot be reduced to artificial rationality.”35 
For von Hildebrand, affective responses are proper to objects like fine art and music, as well 
as persons as intrinsically valuable subjects; these responses to value are “not just instinctual and 
vital but are properly and eminently personal.”36 His delight in the abundance of value found in 
                                                     
31 John F. Crosby, “The Witness of Dietrich von Hildebrand,” First Things (December, 2006), 8. 
32 Ibid. 
33 On the history of von Hildebrand’s personal experience with extreme opposition to his ideas at his university, John F. 
Crosby writes:  
So Hildebrand opposed his Christian personalism to the anti-personalism of the time. And it was on the basis 
of this personalism that her resisted anti-Semitism; he was in fact one of the most resolute voices in all of 
Europe on the evil of anti-Semitism…. He apparently lost the support of many Austrian Catholics over this 
issue; many of them agreed with him until he spoke about the Jews (“Witness ,” 9). 
The consequences of his ideas led to an intellectual unrest at his university during the World War II. Students, 
professors, friends turned against him in his authentic pursuit of truth and value in the face of moral and value 
relativism, and a national exchange of truth for propaganda. Von Hildebrand’s philosophical convictions, his inability to 
compromise his authenticity, forced him to evade the wrath of National Socialism, escaping European cities—Munich, 
Austria, Florence, and Toulouse—for Sao Paulo, and finally, to safety in New York City. 
34 John F. Crosby, “Witness,” 8. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
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everyday life was not merely aesthetic. In fact, as John Henry Crosby points out, von Hildebrand 
recognized the power of beauty as a symbol pointing to the realm of value, which grounds the 
entirety of his philosophical outlook. Rather than viewing beauty as a merely subjective category of 
personal appeal, he recognized the objectivity of it, and how beauty relates intrinsically to both love 
and morality.37 Von Hildebrand had a “preternatural sense for the sacred,” which led to an 
“aesthetic sensibility [that] was bound up with a strong moral sense.”38 This sensibility, often 
devalued in philosophy today, is essential to the phenomenological account of love espoused in this 
work. Far from the shallow aestheticism that von Hildebrand considers with caution, “these feelings 
are not just filling up our hearts, making us feel good or bad; they help us see things for what they 
are and understand the world for what it really is.”39 I will explore further below the connection 
between philosophy and affectivity, and how the sphere of emotions plays a vital role in the 
phenomenology of von Hildebrand and Scheler. For these philosophers, “getting in touch with 
reality is one of the most important things our emotions are for. That’s why reason and emotion—
thinking and feeling—belong together: they both help us get at the truth about reality.”40 These 
themes will be explored fully throughout this work. For both Scheler and von Hildebrand, there can 
be no more fruitful an account of what it means to be a human being than an investigation into the 
affective sphere, into the phenomenon of love.  
 
 
                                                     
37 In his first presentation as a student of philosophy, von Hildebrand “attempted to distinguish between the intrinsic 
aspects of a work of art and those that are extrinsically related to it.” (John Henry) This sensitivity to beauty, and a 
proclivity toward pointing out the objective in a seeming field of subjectivity was a foretaste of one of his lifelong tasks 
and commitments to both philosophical and aesthetic truth. 
38 John Henry Crosby, “Mozart,” 168. 
39 Phillip Cary, Good News for Anxious Christians: Ten Practical Things You Don't Have to Do (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Publishing Group, 2010), 102. 
40 Ibid., 103. 
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We must close the eyes of the body,  
to open another vision. 
-Plotinus 
 
Chapter Two: The Ontology of Love 
 
 
Building upon my apologia of the heart in Western philosophy, can we now speak of love—
the fundamental act of the affective sphere—in a meaningful way? Perhaps I should now establish 
love as an ontologically real phenomenon. Whether love is intangible, illusory, meaningless, or 
mundane will be questioned; these common objections to the reality of love will serve to answer the 
fundamental question: on love, should philosophers remain silent?  I will further explore the 
possibility of a unified definition of love as a complex and spontaneous phenomenological act that 
involves emotion sanctioned by the will that recognizes and responds to the intrinsic value of the 
other. In defense of love as having a unified essence, I claim that if one is to consider love as having 
an ontological existence, its nature must be of something more than a passion reflected in the 
Romantic ideal, more than a relative, subjective experience in the pejorative sense of the term. In 
spite of the varying characteristics and categories of love, it remains a unique and personal 
phenomenon, the essence of which I will attempt to adequately describe in the subsequent pages. 
The idea of an “ontology” of love is perhaps best expressed in the words of Paul Tillich, 
from his essay Love, Power, and Justice. He expresses how these three concepts “are metaphysically 
speaking as old as being itself. They precede everything that is. They have ontological dignity. And 
before having received ontological dignity they had mythological meaning. They were gods before 
they became rational qualities of being.”41 
                                                     
41 Paul Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice: Ontological Analyses and Ethical Applications (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1954), 21. 
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Although many disciplines describe love in term of the poets, attributing to it such words as 
ephemeral, attraction, attachment, and even addiction, love is ontologically real. This attests to an accepted 
pluralism of accepted ideas on the topic. A definition that transcends the cultural, historical, or 
psychological interpretation of love is missing from many emergent understandings of the concept. 
Philosophical work within traditions as old as that of Aristotle, and the medieval school of 
Aquinas—and as young as the phenomenological tradition of Scheler— have attested to the truth of 
love having an essence that is real, ordered, and even transcendent. The approach of this paper 
emerges from the phenomenological tradition, a method that Scheler and von Hildebrand consider 
to transcend the scientific, biological, psychological, historical, and cultural interpretation of love: 
phenomenology attempts to “see,” to “get at” what love is at the personal level. 
The first objection commonly raised is that love is an imaginary concept, that it is mere 
poetic fancy, and bears no “tangible” effect on reality. Throughout much of his work, most notably 
in his text What is Philosophy? Von Hildebrand seeks to establish that love is objectively real. Here he 
clearly defines the difference between the subjective and objective existence of things: 
To be subjective may mean, first of all, to pertain to the personal world, as opposed to the 
impersonal world; it would mean something belonging to the personal subject of knowing, 
willing, loving, and so forth. In this sense everything which is a real “part” of a person may 
be called “subjective.” An act of knowledge, an act of will, an act of love or joy are all 
subjective in this sense; a rock or a tree would not be subjective in the same sense.42 
 
A part of the human experience is the subjective, personal experience of love. While loving may be 
an inherently subjectively felt or experienced phenomenon, this in no way renders the act of love a 
purely subjective phenomenon that does not exist outside of one’s subjective reality. On the contrary: 
But let it be clearly marked and known: the acts of knowing, love, and so forth are fully 
objective realities. They are at least as “real” as a stone or a tree. Thus the term “subjective” 
                                                     
42 Von Hildebrand, What is Philosophy?, 153-154. 
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refers to the ontological feature of being a “subject,” a person, and not to the 
epistemological feature of being an appearance for a subject.43 
 
Love is an ontologically real essence, but exists in varying degrees of expression; each has his or her 
own interpretation or experience of love’s existence. However, ontologically speaking, love can be 
considered a unified concept. The love for a romantic other, a brother, or a friend differs in some 
form, yet we call each a variant of a fundamental love of the other. Love exists as both an affective 
response to the intrinsic value in the other and as a choice in the sense that our response is 
sanctioned by the will. What it means to love is to both respond to the value of the other experience, 
and into the transcendent and active ethic of choice. Human experience of actual “love” is an active 
emotion; it is the love that Aquinas speaks of when he talks of its “power” beyond mere 
“passion.”44  
Nussbaum attests to the knowledge of such love, and the reality, for “knowledge of our 
heart’s condition is given to us in and through certain powerful impressions, impressions that come 
from the reality itself of our condition and could not possibly come from anything else but that 
reality.”45 In this small insight, Nussbaum touches upon a fundamental idea that serves as a thread 
throughout the work of Scheler, that “impressions” or insight are the intuitions of reality that 
phenomenologists seek in the pursuit of philosophical knowledge of reality, especially in our 
response to the personal value of the other. 
To continue the discussion of love’s ontologically unified essence, we will consider an idea 
that is recurring in the writings of von Hildebrand. On the irreducibility of love’s essence, he writes: 
                                                     
43 Von Hildebrand, What is Philosophy?, 154. 
44 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica. 
45 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, 266. 
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Many necessary essences stand in their fullness before our minds and are grasped as things 
which cannot be broken down or reduced in any way. Such, for example, are the color red, 
the essences of love, space, time, and so forth. Here intelligibility means a unique “meaning-
fullness” which renders it possible for our minds to grasp the object “From within.”46 
 
There are two fundamental ways in which we can perceive objects, by way of a “seeing from 
without,” part and parcel of an incomplete perception, and a “seeing from within,” which is the 
essence of philosophical perception. Regarding such differences in perception is to realize the 
difference in position between the philosopher and the scientist: 
Philosophical distance, on the contrary, entails freedom from all arbitrariness. It renders 
possible our allowing ourselves to be borne along in knowledge by the main theme of the 
object in question. Above all, in this remoteness of the spiritual position from which 
philosophy considers the object, there is no “seeing things from without.” We saw, in our 
analysis of a priori knowledge, that the mind is able to know “from within” only those objects 
having an essence that can be grasped intuitively. We saw, furthermore, that this knowledge 
from within is one of the deepest characteristics of philosophical knowledge.47 
 
These two stances on seeing are intricately tied to love and perception of the other. He explains this 
way of seeing as one which “leads us to consider the beloved person under a false external 
aspect.”48 This aspect is devoid of the profound seeing or apprehension of another in full light of 
their uniqueness and individuality, their subjectivity. He explains the danger when one sees strictly 
“from without” as a “source of a typical misunderstanding of the other person and is radically 
antithetical to love.”49 Here von Hildebrand makes clear the moral accountability of one whose 
vision is restricted to the first intent of seeing. One’s vision is flawed, and von Hildebrand even 
considers this an attitude “antithetical to love.” 
                                                     
46 Von Hildebrand, What is Philosophy?, 133-134 
47 Ibid., 204. 
48 Von Hildebrand, The Nature of Love, 334. 
49 Ibid, 334. 
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When we behold our lover from this phenomenological stance, we are in fact “seeing the 
other ‘from within,’ which holds a special significance for philosopher Dietrich von Hildebrand. He 
goes so far to say that “love is by nature a ‘seeing from within.’”50 This involves an active perceiving 
where one lives “in his or her depth.”51 This depth-seeing means that this sight, beyond the passive 
or receptively-seeing in the first sense (with the sensual eye), involves a deeper commitment to 
seeing beyond the physical sense of self, much like our love of neighbor commands humans to love 
with a willing that is beyond our primitive human faculty of love.  
In considering the ontology of love, it is important to account for the relational aspect, the 
intersubjectivity of two persons in love. While love is a non-physical existence—you cannot point to 
it in any physical sense—there are aspects of the relationship between man and woman that point to 
love’s mediating presence. Yet, although one cannot effectively “point to” love, it can be known by 
its fruits. I will speak of this notion in terms of two aspects of this interpenetration of selves, that is, 
in terms of “mine” and “we.” Firstly, love is often considered in the sense of a shared “we,”52 a 
love that transcends each lover’s unique experience and brings each person into a unique 
communion bound by love. It is an experience that is reflected in a play of shared moments, in a 
reciprocated relation of two subjects joined by this new shared experience in love. In this new 
relation we find a communal orientation marked by an intentio unionis and an intentio benevolente—the 
desire for union and a willing of the good for the other—that brings two persons in love together in 
this shared “we.” 
                                                     
50 Von Hildebrand, The Nature of Love, 334. 
51 Ibid. 
52 For a more in-depth discussion of the new “we” that arises out of merging solitudes in love, see Nozick’s The 
Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989). 
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Let us consider the relation between the qualities of personality and our motivation for love. 
Poets and plebeians alike seek to convey the particular characteristics of another in an attempt to 
explain their motivation for love. We may be drawn to the other by an attraction via the 
characteristics of personality; however, to love a person for a set of characteristics is inaccurate. 
Many romantics tend to glorify particular traits of the beloved—a sanguine pallor or a waterfall of 
auburn curls—in order to express their love. This impassioned “fall” into love, although aesthetically 
appealing when framed poetically, is a different category of experience, and not constituent of love 
itself. In an example cited by Fulton Sheen, 
If one is asked why he is in love with a particular person, he may, if he is a logician, put his 
argument into some such form as this: 
 
 It is our nature to love goodness:  
  But X is good:  
 Therefore, I love X.53 
  
What is missing from this argument is the personal element. We are “attracted” to individuals for 
characteristics X Y or Z. We love individuals, however, not for X, Y, or Z, but for the sake of the 
individual him or herself, for his or her intrinsic value. We are missing that which is eminently 
personal, as Scheler and von Hildebrand would say, if we love the other because they bear goodness. 
For “goodness” to be a premise for our love, the argument would have to be amended to 
personalize the X in terms of the individual, overall value-response. Love aims at the irreducible 
subject, the unique and wholly other person. There is a fundamental distinction between “loving for 
X,” where X is a characteristic, and “loving X,” where X is an individual. This marks the ultimate 
difference between mere attraction, affection, or lust and genuine love for another person. This 
irreducibility of love is precisely why phenomenology is the methodology used in this work: it 
                                                     
53 Fulton J. Sheen, Three to Get Married (Princeton, N.J.: Scepter Publishers, 2004), 16. 
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encompasses the attitude of “letting things be,” which is—quite apart from qualitative 
measurements—precisely what it takes to account properly for our value-response, our love of 
another human person. 
Attraction, affection, and lust are examples of what von Hildebrand terms “pseudo-loves,” 
or “passive” feelings—or the vital or psychological for Scheler—which, in the case of attraction and 
affection, may in fact ultimately lead to love. These three examples are ontologically lower emotions, 
and, in Schelerian terms, they are closer to the vital level than the spiritual level. The task of this 
work is to outline the emotion of love, which is the ontologically highest emotion for both Scheler 
and von Hildebrand. Before I begin to outline the nature of love in phenomenological terms, let me 
begin with a brief analysis of the realist phenomenological approach underlying this thesis. 
Love on the Mind 
 
Can the sciences allow us to come to a deeper understanding of love? When arguing in favor 
of the objective reality of love, a scientific consideration should be considered given recent progress 
in the field of neurology. In contemporary research, neurological studies have claimed to pinpoint 
areas in the brain that correlate with human receptivity to love. Such empirical evidence can, at least 
in part, provide insight into the phenomenon of love. Multiple studies in neuroscience claim to have 
pointed us to the source of the human experience of love. Is it accurate to say that we “love” with 
our mind? Although studies in neurology have focused on pinpointing “love on the brain,” this is 
only a one-dimensional picture of the human experience of love. This does not mean, however, that 
this evidence is irrelevant to the pursuit of truth.  
The work of Helen Fisher points toward a scientific correlation between brain activity and 
the limbic response of a lover: “Regions of the prefrontal cortex monitor the pursuit—one's 
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progress toward the goal: emotional, physical, even spiritual union with the beloved.”54 That is to 
say, both the joy and suffering of a person “in love” has been charted as a neurological 
phenomenon. A basic empirical understanding of human emotion—evidenced by the growing 
research on the correlation between the brain and emotional response— is valuable in our pursuit of 
knowledge: 
The prefrontal [lobe] is the brain of involvement… It gives us the taste, the enthusiasm for 
what we choose. It does not give us merely a barren notional knowledge, but makes us 
assent with our whole hearts to what we know. And this is what would appear to be the full 
significance of the prefrontal. Its real name is the brain of the heart, the organ of love.55 
 
Many philosophers and theologians refer to the heart as the origin of emotion, an allusion that 
serves to ground affective discussion in a non-physical, metaphorical realm of the body. Many 
scientists, however, would consider this reference to the heart more metaphor than anatomical truth. 
Further, knowledge of cognitive correlation between reason and emotion “made for the wedding of 
emotion and intellect, a ceremony that perhaps took place in Paul Chauchard’s ‘brain of the heart’ –
the late-arriving prefrontal brain—to produce that exhilarating experience we call love.”56 This 
“wedding” of emotion and intellect is an idea that only recently received scientific illumination. 
Neurology, it seems, relegates “love” to merely an “exhilarating experience.” This discussion will 
reconsider the recurring confusion between ephemeral feeling and willing emotion. The neurologist 
reduces the complex range of human emotions to one specific response, and appears to have 
empirically measured the human phenomenological act of love.  
                                                     
54 Helen Fisher, Why We Love: The Nature and Chemistry of Romantic Love (New York: H. Holt, 2004), 267. 
55 Anthony Walsh, The Science of Love: Understanding Love & Its Effects on Mind & Body (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 
1996), 90-91. 
56 Ibid., 185. 
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This scientific conception confuses the fundamental difference between the limbic responses 
of pleasure—associated with lust, attraction, and the romantic conception of “falling in love”—with 
the profound value response of love for another person.57 One aim of this work is to exemplify the 
difference between the feeling of falling in love with being in love, as “what some people love is not 
a person, but the experience of being in love. The first is irreplaceable; the second is not.”58 While 
the manifest presence of love might appear in synaptic relations in the brain, love remains essentially 
intangible. This work will argue the higher relevance of love as a response to value, and the reality of 
love as an ontological category that is not reducible to impulses in the brain. Although neurological 
studies have mapped the cognitive response of the human phenomena of falling in love, they have 
not fully accounted for the human experience of love. There is a need in both the sciences and 
philosophy for a “rehabilitation” of the heart for our understanding of love; “can the role of the 
most affective of all affective responses be ignored?”59 The goal of this work is to serve, at base, as 
an apologia for the heart and emotions as vital pursuits in philosophy. I further seek to outline what, 
at base, value-realist phenomenology is in order to ground a phenomenological exploration of love. 
Perhaps both the scientific and philosophic thinker will begin to recognize the value of the 
affective response, as perhaps “the remedy for all the sufferings of the modern brain lies in the 
enlargement of the heart through love, which forgets itself as the subject and begins to love the 
neighbor as the object.”60 As it stands, science can only explain the response of falling in love, it 
cannot, however, explain the why of our love. Biology can and will only explain the physiological 
                                                     
57 Von Hildebrand writes: “The fact that love is a value response, essentially implying an intentio unionis and an intentio 
benevolentiae, and the fact that there is a difference between the imago Dei and the similitudo Dei are all apriori facts and 
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values presuppose a person” (What is Philosophy? 137). 
58 Sheen, Three to Get Married, 1. 
59 Von Hildebrand, The Heart, 17. 
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reactions of human love. It cannot chart the raison du couer, the inner workings of the human 
affective sphere. Only when the effects of love become manifest in human thought and behavior, 
visible enough through sight “from without” for scientific inquiry to begin its measurements, is love 
subject to any sort of empirical analysis. Everything prior to and beyond this outward appraisal of 
love falls under the lens of philosophical inquiry. In listing the different aspects of the mysterious, 
von Hildebrand numbered love as among life’s mysterious phenomena. Love can be considered one 
of life’s mysteries,61 in that: 
because of its depth and richness, is inaccessible to a purely rational penetration meo 
geometrico, in a geometrical fashion. In this sense the human person is a mystery; love is a 
mystery; beauty is a mystery. Though they are not supra-rational, although they in no way 
contain antimonies, these mysteries escape the kind of rational explanation which is to be 
found in logic or mathematics.62 
 
Precisely because of its profundity, love cannot be assessed solely meo geometrico. While there is 
undoubtedly a cognitive element—as this work will attempt to illustrate in the section titled love and 
knowledge—love is beyond reduction to reason.63 Of course, there are “reasons for love,” but they 
do not read like a checklist of items. This is precisely the mistake of reductionism, as I have outlined 
earlier. In the words of Fulton Sheen, “love needs no reasons… love never asks "Why?" It says, "I 
                                                     
61 For another phenomenological perspective on the person and love as essentially mysterious, see the work of Gabriel 
Marcel. He discusses the difference in philosophy between “problems” that do not essentially involve the knower, and 
“mysteries” which involve the knower in a personal, existential way: Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being I: Reflection and 
Mystery, Trans. G.S. Fraser. (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2001). 
62 Dietrich von Hildebrand and Alice M. Jourdain Von Hildebrand, The Art of Living (Chicago: Regnery, 1967), 55. 
63 We find this idea of our love for the other as mysterious clearly articulated by John F. Crosby: 
The more you come to know and love some person, the less you find yourself able to express what it is that 
you know and love. You find something in the other that is unutterable, ineffable, unspeakable. You can 
describe well enough the various qualities of the other, the types and kinds that he falls under, but there is 
something else, something deeper in the other that escapes your expressive and descriptive powers. You see 
and experience this something else as you come to know and love the other as person, but you cannot render it 
in clear concepts, and you just stammer when you try. What you are encountering is precisely the other as 
unrepeatable person. The problem is that our language is only suited to expressing properties that are common 
to many; it fails us when we try to give expression to that which is unrepeatably some person’s own (John F. 
Crosby, “Persons are Unrepeatable,” Lay Witness, May 2000). 
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love you." Love is its own reason.”64 The reasons for love indeed “are so deep that we can never 
exhaust them with our knowledge. 65 Perhaps Gautier is correct in intertwining the heart and mind 
in the task of loving. This work will attempt to point toward the underlying aspects of love’s nature, 
and address the essential structure of love according to the phenomenological value-realists, Dietrich 
von Hildebrand and Max Scheler. Let me begin by clearly establishing love as a subject of 
ontological inquiry. 
The Phenomenological Approach 
 
As I already explained, I wish to focus on the phenomenological tradition, as it is the best 
lens to approach the nature of love and it is through this lens that both Scheler and von Hildebrand 
view the meaning and task of philosophy. The meaning of the word “phenomenology” is the science 
of appearances or of appearings.66 It is an essential approach of the discovering of, the seeking of 
truth of things-in-the world. Phenomenology is a philosophy centered in the descriptions of the 
revealing or unconcealment of phenomena, and each philosopher within the tradition presents an 
array of different phenomenological “themes” within his or her work. Ricoeur describes such 
themes as the “melodic lines of existential phenomenology.”67 The main “themes” of existential 
phenomenology which Ricouer explicitly describes include: 
(1) The “owned body” found in the work of Marcel, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty. 
(2) The “freedom” found in Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre. 
(3) The theme of “the Other” found within the work of Sartre. 
 
The primary philosophical voices I will reference in this essay—Scheler, von Hildebrand, and 
Marion—are phenomenologists whose work indeed contains existential themes, and do not fall 
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quite easily into any one of these three categories.68 Perhaps the theme of “the Other” is the best 
categorization for Marion. Although von Hildebrand was a student of Husserl, his work departs 
explicitly from Husserl’s strict phenomenological methodology. I would consider the main “theme” 
of von Hildebrand and Scheler, two “value realists,”69 to be that of the value-response, an affective 
intentional act in which we find a “deep, meaningful, and intelligible relationship between the act 
and its object.”70 Value-realists respond to the value of different categories of objects, from “the 
beauty of noble music or the nobility of a moral act,”71 to the beauty of a virtuous person or the 
beauty of our beloved. Perhaps, then, a new class of existential phenomenologists needs to be added 
to include the thinkers I reference in this work, namely, von Hildebrand, Scheler, as well as Karol 
Wojtyla. Having briefly outlined the phenomenological approach, I will move to a brief overview of 
two predominant areas of philosophy that are related to the philosophers referenced in this essay: 
existentialism and personalism. 
While scientific inquiries and answers deal predominantly with the empirical human object, 
philosophical inquiries of the existential thread deal with the particular human subject. The themes 
of existentialism and personalism both deal primarily with the concretely unique individual. 
Although this claim is backed by the science of biology—there has never been and will never be 
again another genetic “you”—this explanation does not adequately explain the philosophical theme 
                                                     
68 In recent scholarship, the idea of Kierkegaard as a phenomenologist has gained popularity (see Jeffrey Hanson’s 
Kierkegaard as Phenomenologist: An Experiment [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010]). One scholar focused on 
the theme of Kierkegaard as a phenomenologist of love is my thesis chair, Dr. Michael Strawser. 
69 This term I borrowed from John J. Drummond’s description of Scheler in his introduction to Phenomenological 
Approaches to Moral Philosophy: A Handbook, page 9: 
For Scheler, values rather than objects are the primordial phenomenon; values precede their objects, and our 
apprehension of the object as valuable depends on a prior apprehension of the value, an apprehension that in 
no way depends upon any inductive or causal inferences from sensory experience. 
70 Judith Stewart Shank, "Von Hildebrand's Theory of the Affective Value Response and Our Knowledge of God,” 
Aletheia: An International Journal of Philosophy 5, (January 1, 1992):  155. 
71 Von Hildebrand, Ethics, 208. 
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of personalism. This example serves to further von Hildebrand’s claim that philosophy “stands in an 
incomparably deeper relation to the spiritual life of the person.”72 This is, of course, to presuppose 
a spiritual element of man. The existential/personalist phenomenological accounts of Kierkegaard, 
Scheler and von Hildebrand move from the claim that humans are more than physical beings; we are 
fundamentally spiritual beings. Philosophy “requires a much more essential awakening, a much 
sharper eruption from the ordinary attitudes of life than do all the other sciences.”73 This existential 
notion, that philosophy deals with an “essential awakening” of the self is central theme of 
phenomenology. Many philosophers of his tradition consider the “ordinary attitudes of life” as the 
“natural attitude,” one which philosophy leads us away from, toward a more “awakened” sensitivity 
to the world around us. The next chapter will serve to develop further the phenomenological 
attitude as it pertains to love. I will begin with a discussion of Scheler’s phenomenology of the 
emotions, which greatly influenced the von Hildebrand’s work. My examination of the value-realism 
of Scheler and von Hildebrand will take root in a phenomenological analysis of the sphere of 
affectivity in an attempt to shine light on the philosophical complexities of the human heart. 
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Love is always what awakens both knowledge and volition;  
indeed, it is the mother of spirit and reason itself. 
Max Scheler 
 
Chapter Three: Max Scheler’s Stratification of the Emotional Life 
 
In his work The Nature of Sympathy, Max Scheler provides a phenomenological account of the 
emotions, from love to hatred. This section will focus on Scheler’s phenomenology of love, for his 
“insistence on the primacy of emotions over cognition, love over control, or recognition over 
cognition…provides a welcome antidote to the reifying tendencies that mark the contemporary 
human sciences.”74 It is important to note that toward the beginning of his study, Scheler begins 
with a declaration: “the ultimate essences of love and hatred, as inherent in acts, can only be 
exhibited; they cannot be defined.”75 Although he claims it is impossible to define the essence of 
love, Scheler indeed provides a full account of what love is and is not. How he attempts to account 
for the existence of love is to be examined at length in this chapter, as I will draw primarily upon 
three of his main texts, The Nature of Sympathy, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, and 
On the Eternal in Man. 
Scheler begins by disambiguating the common assumption that love is derived from a sense 
of fellow-feeling, that its reality can be reduced to a feeling of benevolence for another.76 He 
explains that while we can love intrinsically valuable things, like knowledge, beauty, and God, we do 
not necessarily feel “benevolent” towards them. This opening discussion served as a response to 
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75 Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1970), 152. 
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what Scheler perceives as “one of the gravest errors… of British moralists,”77 and what he 
considers to be a return to Greek and Christian ethics in placing an ontologically independent value 
on the reality of love, without attaching to it, or placing before it a lesser term of feeling to dampen 
the power of the emotion. 
The philosophical anthropology of Scheler is founded upon the understanding of human 
emotion. Once we unlock the phenomenon of love, we come closer to an understanding of 
Scheler’s concept of individuality, for “[a]cts in which [a] person reveals himself most deeply are 
emotional acts.”78 He presents an existential-personalist worldview, in which human persons are 
subjects oriented toward participation in the world of value, an absolute value-laden reality that we 
have access to by our human faculties, of which emotion is primary. Scheler’s concept of value-
realism is indivisible from his concept of person-in-the-world, for “who the person is is revealed in 
and through the life that he is creatively living out…the person unfolds in reciprocal relation to the 
unfolding of the concrete existential situation in which he finds himself.”79 The overarching 
“theme” of Scheler’s “existential situation” is, according to A. J. Luther, the theme of value.80 
Our intentionality in the world unfolds under this ultimate aspect of value. Hence Scheler’s 
zealous approach to the emotional in man’s experience in the world; how often in philosophical 
circles is this integral aspect of human experience overlooked and disparaged in the pursuit of 
                                                     
77 Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, 140. 
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reason? In his phenomenology, the emotional sphere of man is the core of his being, for “love 
grounds the meaning of all other acts, whether emotional, rational, volitional, etc.”81 Love is the 
central act of the affective sphere, the most powerful and defining feeling. Love reveals the human 
person at his inmost depths, “thus [love] reveals [the] person concretely.”82 Love is feeling at the 
highest level of Scheler’s stratification of emotional life: the spiritual. What is love’s essential relation 
to value? For Scheler, love is an intentional act “fundamentally directed towards value.”83 A value-
realist par excellence, for Scheler “the perception of value, in this case, love, is a unique irreducible 
emotional act.”84 Love, a response to the value of another human person, is not reducible to any 
single factor; aspects like rationality, volition, or sexuality cannot alone or together point to the truth 
of love. 
 Scheler does not attempt to merely justify a reconsideration of the relevance of emotion in 
the life of a human person; he elevates the role of the human affective sphere above all other human 
faculties. His justification, according to Luther, is that feeling is “the dynamic presence of a person 
in the world, is value perception, the unique unveiling of the world in its dynamic actuality.”85 What 
constitutes the individual person? I will now examine Scheler’s concept of the human person, and 
how the idea of the person grounds the phenomenological relationship between love and value. 
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Radically Individual Personhood 
 
For a richer consideration of what Scheler means by the “dynamic presence” of an individual 
person, it is important to note the fundamental philosophical strands of personalism that are 
revealed throughout his works. The agents of love are persons—unique, unrepeatable individual.86 
To be a person is to be unique; “[t]o be unique is to be irreducible, which is to be in such a way that 
confusion of one person with another is radically impossible. Strictly speaking, for Scheler, being is 
personal, absolute, unique, irreducible.”87 Every human person, for Scheler, “has an essence all his 
own, that is, an essence that could not possibly be repeated in a second person.”88 What is at the 
core of this uniquely individual person? The person is irreducible because of individual value, thus 
each person is constituted individually by a unique value-essence. This essence “stands at the center 
of the individuality of a person, [and] has nothing to do with logical constructions,”89 meaning that 
a person is not constituted by external characteristics either unique to the self or in relation to 
others. For example, Sophia’s individual personal essence can be no more understood in terms of 
her humility or height than by her identity as daughter or dancer. This is the premise of the value-
realist phenomenology of both Scheler and von Hildebrand: to be a person is to be an essentially 
irreducible subject of intrinsic value. The complexity of the human person is realized in the 
                                                     
86 Noting the difference between “person” and “individual” that is found in the tradition of personalism, John F. 
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89 Ibid., 150. 
30 
 
complexity of personal individuality. The individual is so radically other that it is unutterable 
(individuum est ineffabile).90 
That the person is irreducible points to the fact that “[t]he mystery of personal being is rich 
in content.”91 Thus, the mystery of person qua person is profound. However, because this mystery 
of the person is irreducible, Scheler does not mean to allude to a center so ambiguous that it has no 
foundation in reality, no real content. The element of the person, the unique “theme” if you will, is 
value. To understand the personal value that Scheler speaks of, we must understand that the basic 
constitution of the person is that of subject, and not object, for “[p]erson as person is never an 
object.”92 He describes objects as things “finished, complete, static…susceptible to empirical 
observation of some kind.”93 Hence, the role that phenomenology plays in adequately accounting 
for acts of the person that are irreducible and mysterious as persons themselves.94 The subject, 
persons, are not “susceptible to empirical observation,” but subject to a phenomenological 
investigation in which one “must cultivate an openness in which what is actual in the real may reveal 
itself to him as it is in itself.”95 This phenomenological openness is related to Scheler and von 
Hildebrand’s “fundamental moral attitudes” that at once informs the philosophical approach to the 
object—in humility, reverence, and love—as it informs the personal approach to the subject of our 
love.  
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Returning to the ineffable character of love, this idea attests to speak of our love in terms of 
qualities or characteristics attributed to the other. In attributing our love to a set of characteristics or 
even a central one, we are tending toward a reduction of the other in the sense of an object. Yes, 
one can adequately capture the “essence” of a tree by describing its characteristics—the greenness of 
the leaves, the woodenness of the trunk—but we cannot account for the essence of person qua 
person by listing qualities available to our sense-perception. In our attempt to speak of the other in 
this way, we reduce the person to an object constituted by an array of qualities that are seen, felt, and 
heard. This is difference is pronounced in our love of the other, for 
the love which has moral value is not that which pays loving regard to a person for having 
such and such qualities, pursuing such and such activities, or for possessing talents, beauty, 
or virtue; it is that love which incorporates these qualities, activities and gifts into its object, 
because they belong to that individual person.96 
 
It can be said that we are drawn to certain qualities of others; we are attracted by intelligence, 
kindness, and beauty. However, we do not love a person for their qualities or possessions. That we 
are motivated to love another by desiring or recognizing wealth in the property or personality of the 
other is a frequent category mistake. These features may draw us in to an initial interaction or 
relationship with another. Desire or attraction is motivated by qualities, which perhaps involves the 
sensible or vital sphere of affectivity.  One may derive simple pleasure in the other by virtue of their 
possessions or personality. In this instance, individuals would pursue the maximally valuable other, 
consistently seeking a person of desirable traits until a need or desire is satisfied. If love was 
determined by, say, intelligence, we would naturally seek out the maximally intelligent person to love. 
Yet, this would only increase our immediate pleasure by way of intellectual enjoyment; this is not an 
example of love. One would be forever seeking to intimately engage the mind of others, thus 
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reducing the other to a mere instantiation of a particular trait. The relationship would be cheapened, 
for who would desire to be loved in virtue of a need or interest that is satisfied by another?  
Love, however, is motivated by the person qua person, in a personal response to value. The 
lover desires the response to be eminently personal- I love your intelligence, your beauty, your 
kindness. As Scheler said, “it is that love which incorporates these qualities, activities and gifts into 
its object, because they belong to that individual person.97 Without a personalization of the other, a 
movement beyond the sensible recognition of the other, our relationship cannot move to a spiritual 
act of love. Our response to value is not a general inclination toward merely agreeable qualities, but a 
personal affective response to the other by virtue of it belonging to our beloved.  
The way in which we must understand person and love is from a supremely relational 
standpoint. How we understand persons is through relations, and how we understand love is 
through personal relations: 
The difficulty of approaching being from this perspective lies in the paradox that, although 
personal being is absolute being, absolute being as personal is relational. Personal being is 
not personal, absolute, or unique, ‘outside’ the relational unity which constitutes the concrete 
existential situation. The deepest describable structure of this relational unity is love, more 
concretely persons in love.98 
 
It is the personal act of love that gives us the most adequate insight of others. This “insight” of 
which Scheler speaks is of “the essence of another’s individuality, which cannot be described or 
expressed in conceptual terms (individuum ineffabile), [and] is only revealed in its full purity by love or 
by virtue of the insight it provides.”99 What does Scheler mean by love? The subsequent sections 
will attempt to uncover how love as a relational act reveals the person. Let us now begin to analyze 
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this structure of feeling more clearly, to uncover just where love fits into the spectrum of emotional 
life. 
The Structure of Feeling 
 
The order of the emotions in the sphere of affectivity moves from levels of ontologically 
lower feelings to higher emotions—the highest of which Scheler considers love. This order ascends 
from the more primitive “vital” emotions of pleasure and displeasure, toward the highest “spiritual” 
emotions of beauty, truth and a sense of the sacred, or what Scheler describes as “feelings of the 
personality."100 Moving beyond the strict method of Husserlian phenomenology, Scheler takes into 
account the particularly spiritual nature of man, and emphasizes the intuitive knowledge of man—an 
epistemology rooted in love— that is key to approaching his form of phenomenology.101 Scheler 
defends these claims of an “investigation” into the realm of love, as “love relates, in the first 
instance, to what has value, and to man only to the extent that he is endowed with value and capable 
of advancement in this respect. These acts and their laws can be investigated by means of a 
phenomenological reduction.102 According to Scheler there are four levels of values, which he calls a 
“stratification of the emotional life,” which move from simple sensible feelings to the vital, and from 
psychological to spiritual emotions. The first two levels are labeled “feelings” in particular because 
of the passivity of their nature; they “do not have a lasting duration, are not divisible in space…are 
devoid of deeper levels of satisfaction, and are localized in a particular part of the body.”103 
Through these faculties we arrive at a “sensuous” understanding of reality, which is essentially the 
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“natural attitude” through which we approach life as mere spectators or inductive scientists.104 
Furthermore, this distinction between “feeling” and “emotion” is important because, for Scheler, 
“sensible and vital feelings are properly called feelings rather than emotions because they are 
experienced through the body, while psychological and spiritual emotions are called emotions 
because they transcend the felt experiences of the body.”105 Hence, there are two essential “modes 
of intentionality,” falling under the category of the sensual and the spiritual. Love is an emotion, 
therefore it is best understood as a spiritually intentional act. This is an important point to consider 
when comparing the work of phenomenology with scientific research: biology and neurology can 
only reveal “love” or feeling at the sensual or vital level, for they are inductive sciences that measure 
“facts” on the common-sense or scientific level of the Schelerian spectrum. Therefore, to deny or 
ignore a philosophical intuition is to essentially miss an important aspect of the experience of love 
that cannot be mechanically or statistically quantified: the spiritual. 
The Realm of Value 
 
It is immediately evident from this preliminary glimpse into the mind of Scheler that he is 
presupposing a realist worldview, that there is an independent reality of values that lay just outside 
the subjective human experience of them, and that our love is a relation to these values. An element 
of his personalism is also revealed here, for man is “endowed with value,” and is ethically 
accountable for his love of value, for his apprehension of values in the world makes man “capable 
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of advancement.” 106 As sensible feelings form the primitive origin of man’s spectrum of emotions, 
the communion shared in love is something “which a sensible feeling cannot bring about and to 
which it is blind.”107 Hence, a full understanding of the order of emotions is the key to 
understanding Scheler’s concept of the value-drive movement of the emotional life, and his ontology 
of love. 
Let us look for a moment at what Scheler considers the “five value realms for the human 
person.”108 In his philosophy, the five realms of value consist of the spiritual or divine value, the 
value of the person (moral, intellectual, artistic), the vital value (the appetites, including the sexual 
drive), the useful or practical value, and lastly, the sensual value: the only one differentiated from all 
other values.109All value culminates in love, the highest response to value for both Scheler and von 
Hildebrand. In addition, “love, and the intuitions of the heart, form the core of the person,”110 
which leads naturally to Scheler’s conclusion that it is the heart that forms the center of 
phenomenological intuition. Love, then, is a form of knowledge, following the line of thought since 
Pascal of the heart’s “own reasons of which the mind knows nothing, and can know nothing.”111 
This, however, is a false dichotomy of terms, as I have shown in the previous sections. The mind 
and heart, in fact, are deeply intertwined faculties. A character flaw of Scheler lays in his overzealous 
defense of the heart. He reverses the hierarchy privileging reason to emotion, and instead replaces 
this binary with a privilege of emotion to reason.  
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Beyond the establishment of love as a willing of the subject, in act or movement, Scheler 
proposes that the phenomenon of love is, rather than simply an ephemeral or passive emotion, a 
cause of emotional states, and not simply the effect of them.112 Regarding the emotional eternality 
that love holds, Scheler writes: 
In love…between human beings these acts remain wholly independent of changes in the 
state of feeling, as is shown by the fact that throughout such changes they remain fixed upon 
their objects, as with a steady, unwavering light. Our love for someone does not alter, for all 
the pain and grief the loved one may cause us….113 
 
The concept of love is twofold: it is both a spiritual emotion that arouses knowledge and a spiritual 
act of the will. Love’s reality is similar, in a way, to the nature of light itself. Light acts as both a 
particle and a wave, depending upon the context. Love is indeed a spiritual emotion, the 
ontologically highest response of feeling found in the sphere of human affectivity. But love is also 
sanctioned by the will, and is manifest in an act that can be discerned, as I have mentioned before, 
by its fruits. While it is clear that Scheler means to emphasize the willing element in love, the specific 
relation between love and the “activities of the soul”—the cognitive, the volitional, and the 
affective—is a topic I will explore in-depth below. While he considers love to be “entirely concerned 
with the positive values of personality, and with welfare only so far as it promotes such personal 
value,”114 Scheler does not discount the initial instance of love that is derived beyond a mere sense 
of extended goodwill and a positive feeling paired with an idea of the Other, what I termed earlier as 
a feeling of “benevolence.”115 Is love merely a positive emotion tied to the thought of another 
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human? Along the lines of Spinoza’s reasoning, love becomes merely “a positive feeling 
accompanied by the idea of an external cause.”116 It appears here that Spinoza is relegating love to 
the sphere of sensible feeling, in Scheler’s terms, to that which is merely pleasure or displeasure. 
Here he confuses love proper with attraction. Although it is beyond the scope of this work to fully 
investigate Spinoza’s philosophy of love, I simply wish to draw a connection between Spinoza and 
one of his most ardent critics, Scheler. If this is the case—that love is a positive feeling evoked by an 
external cause—it would follow that any proper ethic tied to the phenomenon of love becomes 
merely an application of moral emotivism. Speaking of “love” in this sensible or vital (passive) sense 
is to confuse the spiritual (active) nature of genuine love. For Scheler posits a definition of love that 
has “an intrinsic reference to value, and for that reason alone it cannot be a fellow-feeling.”117 
Henceforth, love in relation to the human affective sphere will be strictly mentioned with reference 
to emotion, rather than feeling. This assertion of love’s relevance beyond mere feeling is explored 
further, as Scheler directly claims that “love is not a ‘feeling’ (i.e. a function), but an act and a 
movement.”118 Accordingly, he elucidates that it is appropriate to consider love an emotion; the claim 
that love is a ‘feeling’ or ‘affect’ is disregarded necessarily by Scheler’s elaboration: 
All feeling is passive or receptive, whether it be feeling for values or for circumstances (e.g. 
suffering, enduring, tolerating, etc.), and we describe it therefore as a ‘function’. But love is 
an emotional gesture and a spiritual act. It does not matter here whether, 
phenomenologically speaking, the gesture is mainly called forth by its object or is felt to 
proceed from the self.119 
 
The phenomenological nature of love is not primarily concerned with the inspiration of love. Love 
could arise as a value-response to the object, or as a spontaneous act proceeding from oneself, 
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unprompted by an attribute of the object of love. This emphasis on the gesture, as opposed to mere 
function establishes love as a conscientious act in the intellect and heart of the willing individual. A 
gesture is clearly an example of an active emotion, that is, an emotion that is not a mere happening-
to, but a bringing-forth. A gesture involves the element of human will; it is a decision and act of the 
spirit. Scheler places an importance on the idea of love as an ‘act,’ in that “the person… can never 
be treated as an object.”120 This notion of love between two subjects, as opposed to one or more 
objects of love is an essential point in understanding Scheler’s ethical personalism. The mutual 
recognition as subjects is a necessary relation of love between two persons. This intersubjectivity—
the recognition between two individuals as dignified human subjects—implies a sense of mutual 
respect, and a presupposition of valuing others.  
With regard to his idea of a concept of love that is ontologically higher than “passive or 
receptive” feeling, Scheler calls into question the significance of the contrary notions of “active” and 
“passive” emotions. The former is a higher order of feeling, the latter, lower. Ontologically superior 
is the “active” emotion—love and hate—while the ontologically inferior is the “passive” feeling—
pleasure and displeasure. A fundamental aspect of love involves the will. Although willing is not a 
sufficient cause or constituent of love on its own, the will is undoubtedly a necessary aspect of love. 
Our experience of love for the other is not purely a passive happening-to, but a creative activity that 
draws upon our whole self.  
How, then, is love related to the self? Can love be directed toward oneself? This next chapter 
will begin with a focus on Scheler’s philosophy of self-love, serving as a foundation for a critique of 
common conceptions of the love of self. 
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Himself the worshipped and the worshipper,  
he sought himself and was pursued, wood, fired by his own heat of love. 
Ovid 
 
Chapter Four: A Radical Reappraisal of Self-Love 
 
 
In the tale of Narcissus, a word of prophecy was uttered, that “he [would] love himself 
alone, and yet fail in that great love.”121 Ovid’s mythological tale reveals the dark side of self-love, a 
love that is all-consuming to the point of death. The history of philosophical discourse on the topic 
is vast. However, the question remains insufficiently answered: is self-love a real phenomenon? Or 
when we speak of it, are we propagating a philosophical stance that is unfounded, one resting on a 
mere truism? Does current philosophical discourse adequately assesses the possibility or 
impossibility of a love of self? It appears that there are three schools of thought on self-love: that 
self-love exists and is subject to normative restraint, that self-love exists as merely analogous to love 
of the other, and that self-love does not exist, and is replaced by self-hatred. I shall analyze these 
views, as well as Marion’s claim that it is ontologically impossible to love one’s self. I will begin with 
a discussion of self-love in Scheler, followed by an analysis of the views two critics of self-love—
Paul Tillich and Jean-Luc Marion—and bring this views into dialogue with the more prevalent views 
of self-love in Christian theology, to examine which theory, if any, properly account for a love of 
self. This inquiry on self-love will serve to call into question the common assumption that love 
ought to begin with the self. I shall determine whether the advent of a proper or ethical self-love 
serves as a valuable beginning point for our love of others. 
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Self-love in Scheler 
 
 In the essay “Ordo Amoris,” Scheler outlines a brief philosophy of self-love that poses a 
normative distinction between “genuine” spiritual self-love and selfish love of self. He considers the 
former a “certain type of love which must precede the knowledge of individual destiny.”122 Scheler 
explains the former instance as: 
Genuine self-love [Selbstliebe], or love for one’s own salvation, which is fundamentally different 
from all so-called love of self [Eigenliebe]. In love of self we purposely see everything, even 
ourselves, through our “own” eyes only. We refer every datum, even ourselves, to our 
sensuous states of feeling, without having a distinct and clear awareness that this is what we 
are doing.123 
 
According to Scheler, “love of self” is a morally improper love of oneself, a view of subjectivity in a 
selfish sense. In this case, one is “trapped” within one’s own perspective. The sight of this self-lover 
[Eigenliebe] is limited to his own selfish vision. Unawares, he interprets everything from this self-
absorbed worldview. In this way of being, “[c]overed with a web of many-colored illusions and 
phantoms, woven out of stupor, vanity, ambition, and pride, we see everything, including ourselves, 
in the light of love of self. It is quite different in genuine self-love.”124 This Eigenliebe would 
transfigure our perception in a radically negative way. We would be hindered by our self-love, 
affected not only in our intersubjective relations, but in our approach to the world. Even our 
philosophical approach, Scheler would say, would be affected by this fundamentally immoral 
attitude. Given what we understand to be the essential moral attitudes of man—humility, self-
mastery, and love—it would seem inevitable that not only would our personality be hindered by 
such a negative self-love, but our task as a philosopher. 
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As regards “genuine” self-love [Selbstliebe], what Scheler deems “love for one’s own salvation, 
our “sight” is transformed in a positive way. This self-love profoundly transfigures our interpersonal 
and philosophical intentionality: 
Here our spiritual eye and the ray of its intention is focused on a transworldly spiritual 
center. We see ourselves as if through the eyes of God himself, and this means, first, that we 
see ourselves objectively [as if with genuine self-knowledge] and second, that we see 
ourselves as a part of the whole universe.125 
 
Rather than viewing self-love as a simple ethic to live by, Scheler views the proper love of self as a 
philosophically informative orientation. We achieve a kind of self-knowledge through this spiritual 
love of self. In essence, this is the self-love that many theologians describe as loving oneself in the 
way that God loves each one of us. This “agapic” self-love can be seen in imagining the love of God 
when He considers the goodness of his creation, in a sort of divine value-response, so to speak. I 
will address this idea of “agapic” self-love and the implications further later in this chapter.  
The theme of sight, found throughout value-realist phenomenology of Scheler and von 
Hildebrand, plays an important role in Scheler’s conception of genuine self-love. Only in God can 
we cultivate for ourselves a proper attitude of self-love: 
Indeed, we love ourselves, but always only as what we would be before an all-seeing eye and 
only so far as we could stand before this eye…the self-shaping, creative hammers of self-
correction, of self-education, of remorse and mortification strike away all the parts of us 
which project beyond that form which is conveyed to us by this image of ourselves before 
and in God.126 
 
It is sight that rests in God that saves us from the vanity and pride of Eigenliebe. Put another way, 
this selfish love of self is a form of egocentrism. Luther explains the relation between egocentrism 
and inauthentic self-love in his study on Scheler’s The Nature of Sympathy. He writes: 
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Where feeling, that is, who the person is, is directed towards himself in terms of what is 
pleasant or sensuously satisfying solely, this value perception becomes the root of ego-
centrism which is devoid of authentic self-love. Authentic self-love is disclosed where one’s 
spiritual or personal presence and radiance is focused in a transcendent personal center.127 
 
It seems that Eigenliebe as egocentrism is problematic because it limits our knowledge of the self and 
others. We cannot see purely or truly; we are blinded by our selfishness if locked in this world of 
self-love. If, for Scheler, “self-knowledge is a legitimate form of loving one’s self,”128 this 
egocentric self-love is a catalyst for ignorance. Thus, Eigenliebe is rendered an improper love of self 
because it inhibits our pursuit of knowledge—the goal of self-mastery— which Scheler does 
consider a moral attitude required for the philosophical task. What shall we make of this 
contribution to the scholarship on the philosophy of self-love? Scheler’s work on the love of self is 
highly ambiguous, as he fails to leave the reader with a clear understanding of what exactly the love 
of self is.129 Perhaps placing his work in dialogue with past and present voices on self-love will help 
clarify what Scheler might have meant in his normative distinction between proper and improper 
self-love. I will now open a dialogue among contemporary philosophers on the (im)possibility of a 
love of self, proposing a radical critique that will hopefully clarify philosophical discussion on the 
matter, and bring scholars to a clearer understanding of what we mean when we talk about the love 
of self. 
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In his work Love, Power, and Justice, theologian Paul Tillich makes the bold claim that “Self-
love is a metaphor, and it should not be treated as a concept.”130 If he is accurate, his view is in the 
minority of scholarly opinions on the idea. Whether or not Tillich is correct, it is my thesis that we 
should carefully consider our view on self-love. The intent of this inquiry is a reevaluation of 
popular opinion, the common idea that many hold as almost an a priori truth: before I love others, I 
ought to love myself.  
While von Hildebrand defends the claim that self-love cannot serve as the origin, the starting 
point of our love of others, Tillich takes the argument even further, and argues against the 
ontological reality of self-love. Whereas Marion rejects self-love as a sufficient bridge between 
separate selves, the I and the me, Tillich argues against a separation within the self at all, rendering 
any element of unity unspeakable in terms of self-love: 
If love is the drive towards the reunion of the separated, it is hard to speak meaningfully of 
self-love. For within the unity of self-consciousness there is no real separation, comparable 
to the separation of a self-centered being from all other beings. Certainly the completely self-
centered being, man, is self-centered only because his self is split into a self which is subject 
and a self which is object. But there is neither separation in this structure, not the desire for 
reunion.131 
 
Tillich differentiates between the “original solitude” of man, the ontological separation between 
humans, and the “assumed” separation within the self that is amended by love. Neither Marion nor 
Tillich identifies the self as a bridge between two to be crossed in love; there is no separation within 
our self that is comparable to our separation from others. Tillich points out a fundamental problem 
with belief in a love of self: 
The lack of conceptual clarity in the concept of self-love is manifest in the fact that the term 
is used in three different and partly contradictory senses. It is used in the sense of natural 
self-affirmation (e.g. loving one’s neighbor as oneself). It is used in the sense of selfishness 
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(e.g. the desire to draw all things into oneself). It is used in the sense of self-acceptance (e.g. 
the affirmation of oneself in the way in which one is affirmed by God).132 
 
Many Christian theologians often make a normative distinction between the first sense (natural self-
affirmation) as a “proper” form of self-love, and the second sense (selfish self-love) as an 
“improper” form of self-love. This is seen in the distinctions posed by Rousseau, Kierkegaard, and 
Scheler. Tillich proposes that, rather than attempting to continuously justify self-love in an 
ambiguous and often mystical way, philosophers and theologians should begin to speak of self-love 
by eradicating the term “self-love” entirely. He suggests that “it would be an important step towards 
semantic clarification if the term ‘self-love’ were completely removed and replaced by self-affirmation, 
selfishness, and self-acceptance according to the context.”133 Proposing a radical rejection of self-love, 
Tillich leaves us with pragmatic advice on how to handle our talk of self-love. The nature of love is 
within an ontologically separate category from self-affirmation (as most Christian theologians 
conceptualize self-love), selfishness (as Kierkegaard, Scheler, and Rousseau call “negative,” 
“improper,” or “selfish” self-love), and self-acceptance (as many psychologists or counselors advise 
us all to achieve, perhaps via Maslow’s “Hierarchy of Needs”). Let us consider a phenomenology of 
self-love, bringing the concept into dialogue with recent phenomenological thinkers in order to 
uncover whether love directed toward the self is compatible with the nature of love. 
A Radical Love of Self? 
 
To further my rejection of a phenomenology of self-love, I draw upon a contemporary 
source of phenomenology in Jules Toner’s Love and Friendship. How can we experience “love” of 
ourselves in any real sense if we are both lover and beloved?  How can we transcend ourselves in the 
                                                     
132 Ibid., 34. 
133 Ibid., 34, emphasis my own. 
45 
 
way necessary for self-love to be possible? Imagine the impossibility of actualizing the essential 
aspects of love, as directed toward oneself. Is it a tenable position that self-love is, in any way, 
comparable to love itself? I will revisit the key phenomenological aspects of love in order to defend 
my thesis that self-love is indeed a phenomenological impossibility.  
My next point of inquiry is whether or not the element of unity can in the phenomenon of 
self-love. Can one phenomenologically unite with oneself? Can one make a gift of the self to the self? 
These two elements are integral to the accounts of love provided by the aforementioned thinkers. 
According to Toner, “the giving which is an act of radical love is a giving into, so that by it the gift is 
in the loved… for it is myself who am in the loved one by my love, not merely my possessions, or 
even my thoughts, my wit, my joy… It is I myself.134 This brings the discussion back to the 
phenomenology of the gift in love. Here we find striking commonalities between both von 
Hildebrand and Marion’s account of love. Again, we see how love is not directed toward our 
possessions. Love recognizes the radically other self that is the beloved.  Toner’s work furthers the 
personalist theme of loving the person qua person, rather than the accidents of the person. In 
addition, if love is a gift, it follows that it is a gift of the self, flowing from the loving core of the self: 
the heart. How is this giving aspect of love related to self-love? We are of course, self-reflective 
beings. But can this self-reflection begin to constitute a real sense of love for our own self? How can 
we move from a recognition of our self to a love of this self? We reach an impasse when we attempt 
to connect the unity of self-love with the unity of love between man and woman: “The lover wants 
to be in the beloved, to have the beloved  in him, to interpenetrate with the other without loss of 
                                                     
134 Toner, Love and Friendship, 127. 
46 
 
either self.”135 Can we actualize this intimate interpenetration with our self? Even if we can, would 
it be comparable to the interpenetration of lovers?  
Furthermore, when we speak of Toner’s concept of “radical love,” we invoke the language 
of ontology, which presents a phenomenological account that is necessarily different than any 
phenomenon of love. For Toner, “radical love is not a tendency affection but a being affection by 
which I am in union with, am present with the loved one.”136 Can we direct this “being affection” 
toward our own being? Can we form a unity with the self in the way that Toner describes as a 
presence with the loved one? I will bring into dialogue several voices of critique into the discussion 
to ground the theological and philosophical claims made by scholars both past and present in an 
attempt to better understand what is meant by a love of self. 
Voices of Critique 
What is the position of “the self” in our love of others? For Toner, “the self…is only 
actualized in loving others with a genuinely radical love, an affirmation of the other for the other’s 
own sake.”137 While I disagree that the self is a necessarily other-oriented being—I hold that the 
self is both subject and object, the subject as immaterial I and the object as narrative me, regardless 
of its affirmation of others—the emphasis on the actualized self in love is a key point of discussion. 
Toner is correct in holding that “genuine” love is an affirmation of the beloved’s radical otherness 
for the other’s own sake. To bring into dialogue the language of many Christian theologians, it is 
common to establish a dichotomy between eros as loving the other for my own sake, and agape as 
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loving the other for his or her own sake.138 I will avoid speaking in these strict terms, as I feel it is a 
convoluted and problematic dichotomy. Of course, we can use eros in a purely descriptive sense, as 
an analogy; agape as a comparative term for our apprehension of the other’s intrinsic value. Vacek 
explains this dichotomy as it relates to self-love with the following: “The first [agapic] is a direct love 
of self, the second [eros] is indirect. In the immediate object is something other than ourselves, 
which we love as a way of loving ourselves. With the first, we love ourselves for our own sake: 
agapic self-love. With the second, we love another for our own sake: eros.”139 This is an accessible 
way of considering the normative implications of self-love, prescribed by theologians of Nygren’s 
tradition of thought. Although this is a beneficial attitude to hold—we ought to love ourselves for 
our own sake, and we ought to love others for their own sake—I do not think that this normative 
distinction accounts for a phenomenology of self-love. Vacek is merely espousing what Tillich 
words as an attitude of self-acceptance or self-affirmation. Of course: we ought to value ourselves in 
the way we would imagine God would. We ought to affirm the value of others in the way we would 
wish others to affirm our own value. This is an invocation of the classic “golden rule,” the Kantian 
imperative that affirms the other’s intrinsic value, and bars the treating of the other as a means to an 
end. 
I am in line with von Hildebrand’s thinking, as he moves away from the radical sort of 
distinction between the terms that many theologians (Anders Nygren, Christopher West) tend to 
pose, and also “wants to avoid a dichotomy of eros and agape.”140 In the conclusion of his chapter 
on Caritas, he reminds us that “an essential core of love qua love remains common to eros and 
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agape, in spite of their difference."141 The Christian critique of eros, most notably by Anders 
Nygren, is derived from the self-seeking nature of eros. Thus, all pseudo-loves would seem to 
originate in eros, and all (selfish, improper, prideful) self-love would also be eros . If eros indeed loves 
another for its own sake, it is not love at all. It would seem extraneous, then, to even need to attach 
any form of “agape” to love, for eros would cast out the meaning of genuine love entirely, and we 
would be left with love itself, without need for “agape” as a descriptor. It would seem obvious for 
self-love to be positive at all, it would need to rid itself of eros and only bother with expressions of 
agape. If self-love is a tenable position to hold at all, it would most naturally need to mirror the 
selfless love from God. In this way, “agape corrects for selfishness, which is ever ready to mask itself 
as healthy self-love…. When the problem is overweening pride, agape enables us to appreciate the 
value of others in and for themselves.”142 This is, however, a problematic dichotomy to draw, as 
evidenced by the decades of books and articles dedicated to the Christian self-love debate. To begin 
his analysis of self-love in Christian ethics, Vacek suggests that “[s]ome scholars, as we have seen, 
reject self-love because, they say, love needs some separation to overcome. Indeed, it is not easy to 
see how we can act in a self-transcending way toward our own self. But we do perform this self-
referential act.”143 Vacek draws upon the ideas of Karl Rahner in a defense of self-love’s possibility. 
Rahner explains that “self-affirmation is not simply surrender to the instinctive drives of the 
‘struggle for existence,’ but is based on an objective recognition of the value and dignity of the 
subject within reality as a whole and in relation to God. This God-given excellence is not loved 
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simply because it is one’s own, but because it is and is of value.”144 This view of self-love as an 
affirmation of our own intrinsic value parallels von Hildebrand’s idea of love as a value-response. 
Again, as discussed by Tillich, “self-affirmation” is not comparable to love itself. The argument that 
there is an ontological chasm between self-love and other-love still stands. While an aspect of the 
nature of love is present in what many theologians defend as self-love, the complexity of love is not 
comparable when we speak of the love of self. A higher-ordered self-love might be considered a 
response to the “God-given excellence” and an “objective recognition of value and dignity,” yet the 
element of unity present in the love between man and woman is radically different from unity we 
have with ourselves. We cannot love ourselves, but we can affirm ourselves in a way analogous and 
even identical to the way in which lovers affirm the value of the beloved.  
We have the propensity to recognize the metaphysical beauty of ourselves, to cultivate the 
spiritual dimension of our being; we cannot, however, love ourselves in the way that lovers do, the 
way in which spouses love when affirmed in the marital vow. Self-love is, as Tillich explains, merely 
analogous. In his discussion on self-love, von Hildebrand speaks of it primarily in the sense of the 
impossibility for self-love to precede other-love. It is impossible, according to von Hildebrand, “to 
derive the love of other persons from the love of oneself.”145 The idea that other-love can originate 
in one’s love of self would be to reduce love to “the natural solidarity of a person with himself.”146 
The love that one has for another is of an ontologically different category than the self-love that 
philosophers tend to speak of. In his illustration of self-love and its normative categories, Scheler 
merely echoes the ambiguous claims of philosophers before him, without adequately justifying self-
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love as a phenomenon subject to the same philosophical inquiry that both he and von Hildebrand 
subject other-love to. The next section will examine a criticism of self-love from a contemporary 
phenomenologist, Jean-Luc Marion. Beginning with a unique approach to his critique of self-love, 
Marion outlines “three absurdities” of self-love, arriving at its phenomenological impossibility. 
The Impossibility of Self-love in Marion 
 In his book The Erotic Phenomenon, Jean-Luc Marion begins an inquiry into the nature of 
erotic love with a fundamental question “Does anyone out there love me?” From a query derived 
from the point of vanity, the one caught amid love’s contemplation moves from this egocentric 
question to an external impasse. Marion asserts that while a “love of self can indeed be 
proclaimed...[i]t cannot be performed.”147 The contemporary French thinker replaces the Cartesian 
rationalism of the ego cogito with a new ontological outlook. He begins with a new ontology of the 
ego, the ego amans, concluding that I love, therefore I am. 
In effect, no one is closer to one’s self than the reduced ‘me,’ absolutely immanent to the 
self, with an immanence rendered more tangible by the awful solitude that is provoked by 
the erotic reduction. In this solitude, I discover my self reduced to my purest self, melted 
into a new metal, a kernel of egoity so dense that no nuclear reaction could ever fissure it, or 
separate me from myself.148 
 
It is immediately clear that Marion takes a different approach to the self in its “awful” solitude. Here, 
Marion is presenting the I of the ego, the self that is inaccessible to others. It is not the “narrative” 
self, the self extended in time, with an external identity and social presence. Marion reduces the self 
to its simple ontological category of being, before he asks us: could this “strictly reduced 
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me…suffice to love me and thereby assure me of myself?”149 Marion presents us with “at least 
three reasons for this absurdity”150 that is a self-assurance derived from the love of self: 
First, because if I had to love myself like an other than myself, it would be necessary for me 
to precede myself. Those who have loved me originally (in principle, my parents) could only 
do so because they preceded me and they loved me before I was even in a state to receive 
their love; loved without yet being.151 
 
It is ontologically impossible to love oneself because we simply cannot precede our self, we cannot 
separate from our self in the way in which it is required of loving. Marion is not satisfied with man’s 
ability to derive self-love from our own self.  We must be loved first by another, a wholly other 
person outside of our own being. He continues to write, “thus, to love myself, I would have to go 
beyond myself, in order to respect the measure of love, which has none. I would demand of myself 
an excess of myself over myself. But who can add one cubit to his stature?”152 This “original” love, it 
would seem, can come from either our parents or God. For God indeed “loved without yet being,” 
because he loves all beings before creation. Not only can we not love our self, but it would seem 
equally “absurd” to place any value of self-assurance on any other being except for God. For in 
God, the Being who came before all being, our self-assurance, self-love, and even our very sense of 
self would be most safe.  
 In an attempt to address the common explanation of self-love as possible out of the human 
capacity to self-reflect, Marion writes: 
The concern is not that I (as transcendental I) think of myself (as empirical me); the concern 
is loving myself. Loving requires an exteriority that is not provisional but effective, an 
exteriority that remains for long enough that one may cross it seriously. Loving requires 
distance and the crossing of distance. Loving requires more than a feigned distance, or one 
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that is not truly dug out or truly crossed. In the drama of love, actions must be accomplished 
effectively over distance—distributing, going, coming, returning.153 
 
Loving oneself is not reducible to self-reflection. I cannot as I think of Me and be considered “loving 
myself.” Marion defends the radical alterity of the lover that “requires an exteriority,” and a 
“crossing of distance.” Love is, then, an essentially interpersonal act. For, if we can “love” ourself, 
does that imply that we are two selves, that we can “divide” our self into both lover and beloved, 
object and subject? Marion further explains the importance of alterity in the loving act: 
Without the distance of this elsewhere, no one would ever love me. Thus I cannot love 
myself—except by leading myself astray into the insane illusion of imagining myself as my 
own elsewhere. Thus, unable to precede myself, to exceed myself, or to cross the distance, I 
can neither think nor perform the formula ‘I love myself.’154 
 
This “distance” is another way of looking at love’s interpersonal nature as inherently mutual 
participation, as reciprocity. How can I reciprocate my own love for myself? Self-love, then, seems 
an ontological impossibility. Going further with his argument against the possibility of self-love, 
Marion tells us that we actually hate ourselves: 
Thus all love that begins as a love of every man for himself (impossible) ends up, by self-
hatred (actual), in the hatred of the other (necessary). If I claim to love myself or to make 
myself loved, in the end I hate, and make myself hated. Thus the assurance from out there 
remains inaccessible. Vanity in the end bears it away.155 
 
We become frustrated by our need of assurance “from elsewhere;” our lack of assurance in love 
leads to self-hatred. Marion asserts that all claims of self-love are false, and can only become a vain 
self-hatred. What is primary, for Marion, is the advance one makes towards the other. We cannot 
assure ourselves of our own love but we can know when we have initiated the love of another. At 
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best, we can be open to the gift of love in return, but our advance is not conditioned on a response, 
otherwise it would not be a free act of love.  
Marion concludes—in alignment with both Scheler and von Hildebrand— that rather than 
viewing human beings as essentially thinking beings, they are more– humanity is composed of a 
totality of loving beings. He argues in opposition to the human ability to be self-loving. One begins in 
self-hatred, incapable of achieving a sense of self-love independent of the affirmation of the other. 
For Marion, in the phenomenon of the erotic “the other loves me more than I hate myself.” Loving oneself 
in his philosophy is a movement beyond initial self-hatred. One is not ontologically able to love 
oneself in a way comparable to the love we receive from another. Marion holds that our only hope 
for a love of self is derived from the love of another: 
In the end, I love even myself, because the other lover, through her own advance, has made 
me a lover, and thus lovable in her eyes and, because I believed her, loveable in my own 
eyes… I wind up by loving even myself because I have believed, seen, and experienced that I 
too, even I, could play the lover… I believe what she tells me more than what I have ever 
told myself.156 
 
Even at this point, Marion merely proposes the possibility of “loving even oneself” in the sense that 
one recognizes the lovability in oneself. This love of self is the recognition of the self as lover, an 
attitude of belief that the advance is achievable, that we are worthy of an advance: we are lovable. 
Self-love, in this sense, appears as an attitude, a kind of self-assuredness that we receive from the 
beloved. It remains, however, entirely dissimilar from love in the general sense that I have been 
discussing throughout this thesis. There is room for this concept idea of self-love in von Hildebrand, 
for as long as self-love is not attributed as the grounds or motivation for other-love, a love of self 
remains a subtle possibility. Only through the love of another can we begin to love ourselves. The 
relevance of man as an ego amans—a loving being—which Marion espouses is the underlying 
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significance of this essay. The distinction made in the prior discussion of loving oneself serves to 
ground the argument for apt theory and practice: proper grounds for self-love. There is a delicate 
normative distinction between “self-love” and “love of self” that is drawn by philosophers from 
Kierkegaard to Scheler. However, I argue that to remain phenomenologically accurate, in accordance 
with our account of love in the preceding sections, that “self-love” is an impossible phenomenon. If 
we replace, as Tillich suggests, this concept of “self-love” with affirmation or esteem where 
appropriate, we can escape the phenomenological absurdity of loving oneself. 
Drawing the previous account of Marion into this discussion, it would seem absurd that the 
self can love itself in any conceivable way. Again, to echo the philosophy of Tillich, we can only 
speak of self-love as a metaphor. It is inconceivable to account for a phenomenology of self-love 
without invoking a metaphor. Self-love has no basis in reality. It is an attitude, an affirmation of 
value. But it is not a phenomenal act. 
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 Love responds to the overall beauty of the person who is loved. 
Dietrich von Hildebrand 
 
Chapter Five: Dietrich von Hildebrand’s Phenomenology of Love 
 
 
In the first chapter of his work The Nature of Love, Dietrich von Hildebrand roots his theory 
of love on the claim that love “in the most proper and most immediate sense is love for another 
person.”157 Von Hildebrand specifically isolates love as particular to human relations. This 
distinction also implies intentionality, that love is essentially for another, that is, it is directed toward 
another human person. A core aspect of von Hildebrand’s philosophy is the value-response; these 
responses are “related to their object in a highly spiritual, rational, and meaningful way.”158 
Therefore, we can say that the act of loving presupposes a person; our involvement with this person 
affects us in a profoundly personal way.  
Value Phenomenology 
 
Let us now consider the concept of value phenomenology, as “love relates, in the first 
instance, to what has value, and to man only to the extent that he is endowed with value and capable 
of advancement in this respect. These acts and their laws can be investigated by means of a 
phenomenological reduction.”159 Both von Hildebrand and Scheler presuppose that love is just one 
of the many acts comprising the value-laden world around us, to which we react in a value-
responding way. This response is an emotion, for example, of “joy in response to the beauty of a 
piece of great music or sadness over significant personal loss.”160 These two examples of values 
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both material and immaterial will be explored later in this chapter, in connection with the morality of 
beauty as I will examine how affective responses to moral value and disvalue can elicit both 
reverence and disgust, respectively. Von Hildebrand’s theory of “value phenomenology also lies at 
the base of his untiring defense of beauty as a genuine and objective value.”161 Such events, from 
beholding the beauty of a great work of art, to witnessing the moral disgust of a crime against an 
innocent person elicit a profound response in persons because of their capacity to move us 
affectively. These responses “are either appropriate or inappropriate, and it is part of our moral 
vocation that we form our affections in the light of truth.”162 Because the value-response is an 
affective intentional act, we find a “deep, meaningful, and intelligible relationship between the act 
and its object.”163 We respond to the value of different categories of objects, from “the beauty of 
noble music or the nobility of a moral act,”164 to the beauty of a virtuous person or the beauty of 
our beloved. It is within the nature of human persons to be receptive to value to a certain degree:  
 Some people have a greater capacity than others to be affected by values, a greater capacity 
for ardor and awakedness in their responses to values. Their overall relation to the world of 
values, to the important in itself, to all that contains a message from above, is deeper, more 
alert, more intensive, more ardent.165 
 
It will become clear in this work that von Hildebrand and Scheler are value-realists par excellence in 
their phenomenological revelation of the world of values. It is through love that we gain the most 
intimate access to this value affectivity. Love—the most profound response to value in which 
humans can partake—discloses the world to us in the most personal way. Where does this revelation 
of value begin? Let us begin with attraction, the nascent stage of the phenomenology of love. 
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Attraction and Attachment 
Von Hildebrand further differentiates love from the common analogy of “being attached,” a 
comparison prevalent in the sciences. A common model for “love” in disciplines such as psychology 
is describing it in terms of an “attraction-attachment” model. Humans are initially attracted to 
another, whether incited by a physical, emotional, or intellectual interest. This attraction, however, is 
more often reduced to a sexual desire in some way. A refinement of our conception of what 
“attraction” is can be gleaned from philosophers of the personalist tradition. Karol Wojtyla devotes 
a section to his text Love and Responsibility to the role of attraction in love. His thesis is captured in 
this phrase: “attraction is of the essence of love and in some sense is indeed love, although love is not merely 
attraction.”166 Rather than placing sex at the basis of attraction between man and woman, Wojtyla 
suggests that this sexual urge “insists on being raised to the personal level.”167 For our attraction as 
human persons is not purely carnal, but emotional, psychological, and spiritual as well. Ergo, our 
attraction for others rests on our apprehension of the beloved as a person. This founds his position 
on a view of attraction that “does not possess a purely cognitive structure.”168 Our attraction for 
another need not be considered one-dimensionally, as most traditions tend to speak of human 
attraction. We are not directed solely by our sexual drive, and we rarely operate with a purely rational 
decision regarding the object of our attraction. 
This anti-reductionist theme that we have explored earlier in the philosophy of von 
Hildebrand is also present in the work of Wojtyla. Reductionist thinkers tend to place a singular 
focus on one element of attraction. For Wojtyla, “we must recognize that not only extra-intellectual 
                                                     
166 Karol Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, 76. 
167 Ibid., 74. 
168 Ibid., 75. 
58 
 
but extra-cognitive factors, namely the emotions and the will, are involved in that cognitive 
commitment which has the character of attraction.”169 This point exemplifies our theme that love 
involves more than a passive feeling of the lower affective sphere; it involves elements of both heart 
and will. It is a higher, spiritual emotion sanctioned by the will.  
The element of attraction in our love of others possesses no shallow commitment for 
personalist philosophers. Wojtyla holds that the attraction of human persons is oriented toward the 
good. That attraction retains a theme of importance points to the value Wojtyla and others attribute 
to individuals: “For every human person is an indescribably complex and, so to speak, uneven 
good.”170 Therefore, it would be most accurate to consider attraction on the basis of more than just 
fleeting feeling or carnal fulfillment. Attraction, the prelude to the overture of love, possesses both 
an intellectual and affective component. Our ordinary human experience is comprised of both 
intellectual and emotional experiences. Wojtyla is careful to point out the affective importance of 
this prelude: 
The emotions are present at the birth of love because they favour the development of a 
mutual attraction between man and woman. Man’s emotions are in general not oriented 
towards intellectual knowledge but towards experience in a broader sense. This natural 
tendency expresses itself in an emotional-affective reaction to the good.171 
 
Our knowledge of the beloved does not simply increase in a general sense, but in a way specific to a 
couple in love. The self that is disclosed in love is radically different from the self that is disclosed in 
the public eye. For most, in the sphere of love, a rare glimpse into the inner self is reserved for those 
in the special loving relationship. This epistemology of the heart, our knowledge of love presents us: 
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A certain way of disclosing a person’s intimate being and the beauty that the person takes on 
by loving—goes far beyond all of this. It is a knowledge of the loving person that is only 
granted to the one to whom his or her love is addressed. It is a deeper and more intimate 
level that arises in the one who loves when he discloses himself to the beloved person.172 
 
Many can attest to the experience of a new “love world” that emerges from two persons in love; not 
only does the experience of the world around them change, but the experience of each other, and of 
themselves is profoundly altered by this love.173 This idea is explicitly conceptualized in von 
Hildebrand’s work, and how we “dwell” in the world of our love:  
However conscientiously we may be attending to an outward task, we remain in the world of 
the beloved one. Our love of that person, not the activity of the moment, colors the 
atmosphere in which our soul is moving. At every moment it is present to our mind 
(however discreetly) that what we are just doing is not the real thing that fills and guides us; 
that we are not centered in this petty, peripheral section of our life but continue dwelling in 
the depth.174 
 
Here we find the profundity of love’s affect. Love is not a mere happening-to, as I have said, it is 
much more. Love is a happening-with, a mutual indwelling, a shared being-in-the-world. Our  love 
“colors our atmosphere,” our relations with others, even our relation to philosophy. This is what 
von Hildebrand refers to as a superactual response, a concept which we will explore further on. 
Perhaps we are led to a new “awakened” view, a new insight into reality that we were not open to 
before. It has been said that some of the most paradigm-altering scientific discoveries have been 
arrived at through creative imagination. Love plays a definite part in our creativity—we may write, 
paint, think under its influence. Not only can love inhabit our participation in the world of values, in 
our philosophical achievements, but it can affect our ethical life. I will discuss later the correlation 
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between love and virtue, for “[t]he higher the realm of value, the more sublime the response of 
love.”175 
 Furthermore, the effect of love resonates in our every human activity, whether prima facie 
visible or hidden to the cursory glance. Love is a great example of a “superior motif resounding in 
the background, while the foreground is filled by peripheral interests.” He explains how 
A great love, for instance, which inspires our heart and lends wings to our whole existence, is 
likely to resound with its melody throughout our external occupations; it never allows our 
soul to be dulled by the wear and tear of our daily routine, nor silences the voice of our 
deeper personality.176 
 
Perhaps we are not fully cognizant of the permeating effect of love in our everyday lives. It may take 
the loss, however transitory, for us to truly recognize its fruits. 
When von Hildebrand writes of this great liberation of love, he writes in the specific context 
of love’s requital as the source of happiness in love. Our attraction can lead us to 
union, the interchange of looks that expresses love. On the one hand, there is the full duality 
of I and Thou, the clear difference between them, the full consciousness of the Thou of the 
beloved person and his unique individuality; on the other hand, there is the ultimate unity 
that can only be granted by the interchange of looks that expresses love and by the mutual 
sharing in the being of each other.177 
 
Our love for another is far deeper than the “attraction/attachment” account given by psychologists. 
Love cannot adequately be explained as a mere “attachment” to another person. For von 
Hildebrand, this idea of attachment can be attributed to material or inhuman things: we can be 
“attached” to money or clothing, but not to other humans. He cites the examples of humans who 
are unhealthily attached to objects, and how this excessive attachment can be mistaken for love: 
“The heavy drinker does not love alcohol; the greedy man does not love money. They are no doubt 
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attached to these things and are under the power of them; these things have an indescribable 
attractive power for such people.”178 Although von Hildebrand does not deny the element of 
attachment that is often found in love, he separates human attachment in the love of the other 
distinctly from the excessive material attachment of objects.  
An example of this clear distinction between attachment between human subject and 
material object is given by von Hildebrand with reference to a warm bath. The pleasure that arises 
from something considered “merely agreeable” is of a different kind than the response to value. 
While beautiful music and human beings are considered “objective goods which are delightful on 
the basis of their value,”179 objects that satisfy vital needs like comfort and fulfill us with mere 
pleasure do not warrant a value-response. 
When we fall in love, many of us find an unusual degree of attachment to the beloved. We 
find our thoughts and our actions changing to encompass both the thought and action of the 
beloved. We begin to incorporate the other into our sort of life-world: the way in which we 
approach the world, objects, and other people begins to change. And while we may place an 
unusually higher stake in the opinion, thought, and feeling of the beloved, our consideration of them 
that is sparked by a newfound love is not merely due to a so-called “attachment” to the other. 
Although our actions toward the beginning of a romantic relationship may signify a higher-than-
average sense of attachment to the other person, love cannot be reduced to this attitude. Although it 
can be said that when one “falls in love,” as it is inferred from many psychological or neurological 
studies, that one becomes “intoxicated” with his love of the other, the real phenomenon of love is of a 
higher emotional order than mere pleasure or appetitive response to the beloved.  
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Irreducibility of the Other 
 
When we limit our understanding of love to its purely biological aspect that cannot be 
denied, as it is evidenced throughout the sciences—we limit the appreciation of the “awakened” 
reality of love.  To further a point I made in an earlier section, phenomenology allows for a proper 
account of love due in part to its non-reductionistic approach to the nature of reality. We are indeed 
“indescribably complex” beings, irreducible to any particularity. An account of love that 
emphasizes—as von Hildebrand aptly does—the thematicity of the beloved as the intent of the 
value-response does justice to not only the complexity of the human person, but to the complexity 
of love itself.  
 This is why, as von Hildebrand and Crosby plainly state throughout their work, we are 
unable to provide “reasons” for our love. We cannot reduce our “attraction” to the “accidents” of 
persons. In other words, there is an “ineffability of the value-essence of the beloved person.”180 
One cannot possibly put into words precisely that which we love about the other. Love is “essentially 
inexhaustible… [and] essentially indescribable,”181 as Kierkegaard writes. This inability to reduce love 
to its component parts is a personalist idea underpinning the entirety of this work. We do not love 
any singular characteristic of the beloved, whether the characteristic is material (wealth or success) or 
immaterial (intelligence or amiability). As John Henry Crosby explains: 
The principle of the thematicity…is also revelatory of the deeply phenomenological spirit of 
von Hildebrand’s thought, for in phenomenology there is a deep and conscious resistance to 
anything that smacks of reductionism. Indeed one might say that the opposition to the 
reductive spirit is a phenomenological leitmotif. Phenomenology wants things to be what 
they are, whatever they may be, however desirable or undesirable this may be.182 
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The complexity of human experience, radically antithetical to the “reductive spirit” is indeed a 
phenomenological leitmotif. Rather than impressing our ideas upon reality—in this case, love—the 
phenomenologist allows the object to impress its reality upon us. To “explain” love in terms of our 
particular world-view is to impress our subjective interpretation upon it.  
In this way, phenomenologists allow for an “exegetical reading” of reality. It is an approach 
to love with a full awareness of our subjectivity, allowing it to be what it is. The phenomenologist 
appropriately recognizes when he is being subjective in the negative sense—in the case of a jaundiced 
value-judgment in accordance with a non-philosophical, unfounded presupposition—and when he is 
being appropriately subjective, in the positive sense, when personal insight into the nature of the 
reality of the object of perception is actually a glimpse of truth into the nature of the other. Von 
Hildebrand’s “genius for ‘letting things be’ is especially appropriate when the realities in question are 
the ‘great things’—the all-encompassing laws of metaphysics, the great expanse of moral good and 
evil, the reality of the sacred.”183 An example of an inappropriate response to objects is 
aestheticism, what von Hildebrand often refers to as a shallow sense of value and beauty that stands 
in the way of an accurate apprehension of realities. He holds a deep aversion to “an aestheticism 
that, for one reason or another, refuses to recognize the intrinsic and interior bond that binds 
together the realm of beauty with that of all other objective values (and, conversely, ugliness with all 
forms of disvalue), and in particular with the reality of the sacred.”184 In both Scheler and von 
Hildebrand’s life and philosophy, one can find a deep sense of the sacred, a reverence for the 
objectivity of value, and an assertion of the objective value-laden reality.  
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Both thinkers take it as a given that the phenomenological approach to reality is a moral one. 
Man’s place in nature is at once both animal and spiritual, both carnal and moral. In love, the two 
meet. Modern science takes the former for truth and the latter for mystical untruth. It reduces the 
complexity of human nature (denying, of course, that we are in fact human persons) to a 
conglomeration of body parts, of cells with a particular function in the material world. We are no 
more than the sum of our parts. The phenomenology that we encounter here accounts for both 
aspects of man. It does not pretend that man is not animal, nor does it pretend that we live without 
spiritual presence. How do we love when we love another, if the human person is irreducible? 
Considering our prior claim, that the self is both subject and object existing simultaneously, we love 
the other profoundly, “from the lover’s most personal self, with sincerity, intensity, endurance.” 185 
It is from our mysterious center, from a place of love that Kierkegaard, Marion, von Hildebrand and 
Scheler would consider the origin of our affectivity: the heart. Here a parallel may be immediately 
drawn between Scheler’s “primary source” and Kierkegaard’s source of love that is the secret 
nourishment of everything. In Works of Love, Kierkegaard alludes to the source of love within man: 
Where does love come from, where does it have its origin and its source, where is the place 
it has its abode from which I flows? Yes, this place is hidden or is secret. There is a place in a 
person’s innermost being; from this place flows the life of love… But you cannot see this 
place; however deeply you penetrate, the origin eludes you in remoteness and 
hiddenness.186 
 
Perhaps in describing this “hidden…secret” source, he alludes to the “innermost being” of the 
heart. Although, for Kierkegaard, its origins may seem mysterious, this study will illuminate the 
nature of love, and how it affects our lives, from our apprehension of objects in the world to our 
understanding of other. It is from our hearts that we can “affectively affirm this unique person in a 
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response informed by full, detailed, knowledge which catches the delicate shadings of his 
profoundest atttitudes, moods, likes and dislikes, ideals, fears, hopes….”187 This notion of an 
“informed” response foreshadows a later discussion of the interplay between love and knowledge in 
Chapter Six. Although a specified amount of knowledge is not required in order to love another, our 
response inevitably becomes an informed one, for it is our love, our desire to love and be loved that 
leads us to come to know the other. As Scheler might add, eros inspires us to step outside of 
ourselves in order to apprehend the other as a unique, radical other worthy of our love. 
Subjectivity and Objectivity in Love 
Another way of considering the content of “value” in our response to it lies in von 
Hildebrand’s proposed difference between that which is subjectively satisfying and that which is 
objectively satisfying. This is directly correlative of our previous discussion regarding the difference 
between appropriate and inappropriate subjectivity in philosophy. The former arises out of our 
subjective interpretation of value, or that which is valuable to me in a purely subjective way—the 
other is valuable because I deem them to be. The latter arises out of a genuine response to an encounter 
with an object that possesses an objective value or that which is valuable apart from my subjective 
like or dislike of it—the other is valuable because he/she possesses value intrinsically. While the former value is 
subject to one’s unique taste, the latter value retains its status regardless of subjective 
interpretation.188 We may not all agree on the value of chocolate; for some it provides the benefit 
of health, for others the benefit of pleasure, and for a small minority, no benefit at all. In alignment 
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with Aristotle’s third category of friendship, von Hildebrand argues that love, like friendship, “is 
only possible when it is embedded in the good, because only then are we interested in the other 
person as person; this throws clearly into relief the fact that love is a value-response.”189 Neither 
love nor “true” friendship arises out of utility. A person can care about another so long as they 
provide a service of use, or some aspect of their personality is deemed of use to the other—this is 
not a friendship of love.  
Now that we have considered love’s many aspects, what more can we draw from a 
phenomenology of love? I shall discuss the knowledge of the affective sphere—a sort of 
epistemology of the heart—in order to account more fully for the multi-faceted nature of love. 
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It is possible to love more than we know. 
Fulton Sheen 
Chapter Six: Love’s Knowledge 
 
 One of the most difficult debates within the philosophy of love arises when we ask: Does love 
precede knowledge, or does knowledge precede love? Many are left without a satisfactory answer. I will address 
the handling of the topic by our phenomenologists of love. How can we properly found or direct 
our love if we have no adequate content, no knowledge of the object at which our love is directed? 
An “epistemology of the heart” will reveal that “at the beginning, knowledge is the condition of 
love, in its latter stages love can increase knowledge.”190 This section will serve to illustrate how our 
knowledge can inspire and intensify our love. While our perceptual knowledge of the other by way 
of a cognitive intention may initially serve us in grasping the object of our love, the heart leads us 
knowledge “deeper than any spoken word, or any scientific investigation; it is knowledge that comes 
from love, a kind of intuitional perception of what is in the mind and the heart of the other.”191 
In his book The Erotic Phenomenon, Jean-Luc Marion provides an explicit answer to the 
question of love’s knowledge: 
Knowledge does not make love possible, because knowledge flows from love. The lover 
makes visible what she loves and, without this love, nothing would appear to her. Thus, 
strictly speaking, the lover does not know what she loves—except insofar as she loves it.192 
 
For Marion, love is the guiding light of knowledge. In the pure sense of eros, the lover is wrought to 
desire knowledge of the other through her love of the other. We do not know to love; on the 
contrary, our loving precedes all knowledge. This is problematic, as how can we know if we are 
properly loving, or whom we are loving, without a base level of knowledge of the other?  
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Two serious problems may arise if we begin to love the other without any knowledge of the 
heart. We may displace genuine love with forms of pseudo-love, namely, idealization and lust.  
Examples of characters who illustrate the “love” of idealization include Masoch’s Severin of Venus in 
Furs,193 Kierkegaard’s Johannes the Seducer in Either/Or194 and Stendhal’s discussion of 
“crystallization” in his work On Love.195 These men prefer to remain in a “cloud of unknowing,” 
prefer to keep the objects of their affection in the same haze as the lustful seducer, Don Juan and 
Johannes the Seducer. Genuine lovers approach the beloved with a love of truth, in the same way 
the phenomenologist approaches Reality.196 
John F. Crosby critiques this view in his article, “A Question about Marion’s ‘Principle of 
Insufficient Reason.’” In his essay, Crosby initially points out the problematic concept of insufficient 
reason, as it ignores a fundamental reality of the experience of beauty in the phenomenology of love. 
For Crosby, “Marion seems to exclude from his account of love this engendering power of the 
beauty glimpsed by the lover in the beloved person, for he wants love to precede all that one 
apprehends in the beloved person, and to bring it to light for the first time.”197 Even Plato writes in 
his Symposium on the transformative power of beauty when we behold the other. On this point, we 
might recall Diotima’s speech on the ascent of love that moves from the physical or temporal desire 
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for the beauty of another person to the metaphysical or eternal desire for Beauty in its transcendent 
form. We are at first moved by the visible aesthetic beauty of the beloved as we view the other 
“from without.” However, our love moves us beyond this shallow dimension toward the invisible 
depth-dimension of beauty, to apprehend the other “from within.” Only when our desire moves us 
to seek the inner source of beauty do we discover the metaphysical beauty of the beloved which, as 
Diotima teaches us, is superior to beauty that is purely physical. Both Crosby and Marion embrace 
this interrelation between love and beauty. Marion speaks of an “objective” way of viewing the other 
in an “act of me ‘sizing up’ a person’s qualities,”198 which misleads the lover in the same way that a 
strict sight of the other “from without” lacks a full apprehension of the beloved’s beauty. According 
to Crosby: 
This “objective” way of looking cannot lead me to love this person. For this kind of looking 
at another that yields only an object, a composite of qualities, and not a beloved person. It is 
not difficult to understand that it takes a loving way of looking at another in order to catch 
sight of the beauty of the person. This means that love does indeed in some sense precede 
and make possible the appearance of the other as beautiful and loveable.199 
 
So what does Crosby propose is the proper relation between love and knowledge? He proposes that 
Marion’s Principle of Insufficient Reason “captures only part of the truth about knowledge and love 
as they exist in the one who initiates love.”200 The natural answer from the phenomenological 
perspective is that both love and knowledge are in an interplay in the response to the other. We 
equally love to know as we know to love. Can not the mind and the heart be one? Is there not some 
intimate relation between the two, an inevitable “bridge,” so to speak, between the faculties? In fact, 
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Scheler points to the influence of love over knowledge, claiming that “love is what awakens both 
knowledge and willing; it is the mother of both spirit and reason.”201 
In the phenomenon of love, there is no clear-cut progression either from love to knowledge 
or from knowledge to love. The most accurate answer is provided by Crosby, in that “one would 
think that the relation between love and knowledge would be a mutual relation, with the power of 
love to disclose the beauty of the beloved person being only the beginning of the relation.”202 In 
attempting to pinpoint the phenomenological priority—whether it is love or knowledge—the lover 
would be, it seems, unable to definitively prove whether love arose before knowledge, as they are 
deeply interwoven in the experience of love. It almost seems absurd that one would love before one 
would have any knowledge of what one loves. In loving with adequate knowledge, we approach the 
other with emotional maturity. Since our discussion of love is driven by the presupposition that love 
is intentional, would it make sense to say that we naturally do not know the content of our love? If 
love involves an element of the will, can our will have no comprehension of its direction? Certainly 
not, for the act of love “is rather entirely opposed to the arbitrary.”203 These problems are 
addressed by Crosby in the simple conclusion that “the priority of love over knowledge would seem 
quickly to yield to a certain priority of knowledge over love.”204 Love is an irreducible dialectic 
between knowledge and spontaneous loving; we cannot clearly distinguish the root of our love as 
springing from primarily our cognitive or affective experience. 
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The Morality of Love 
 
As I have outlined before in the section on love as a value-response, the powerful effect of 
love is undeniable, as it brings the other to full thematicity, and alters the lover’s perception of both 
the beloved and the world itself. Von Hildebrand refers to a response to the fullness of the other’s 
person. In love, the person becomes “fully thematic,” which means that “the value responded to is 
the primary theme and not the relation to other goods.”205 The lover’s apprehension of reality is 
profoundly altered for the better, and a new vision is revealed. Von Hildebrand writes: 
In every intense and complete love a person undergoes a certain awakening. I begin to live 
more authentically; a new dimension in my personal existence discloses itself and I am 
liberated from the captivity of habits, from the bonds of convention, from dependence on 
the opinions of others, from the social image I have of myself.206 
 
Often considered negative for its “blinding” effect on the person, love can effectively open the eyes 
of the lover to a new way of seeing and a new way of being through the experience of loving 
another. This awakening, far from hindering the lover in his or her ability to act, or inhibiting the 
lover to become, serves as a fertile ground for fully recognizing the idea of the human person, and 
acting in accordance with this ethic, “for it is only when the other loves me that I discover entirely 
new aspects and treasures of his being. With some persons the difference between loving and not 
loving is so great that we are tempted to say that we do not really know them at all until they disclose 
themselves in love.”207 We cannot know a person to the fullest extent of our ability without love’s 
knowledge. This leads us to the question of the relation between knowing and loving. Do we know 
to love, or do we love to know? Which comes first?  
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The Metaphysical Beauty of Love 
 
Beauty is a major theme in von Hildebrand’s philosophy of love. While he by no means 
posits beauty as the theme of love—value is, in fact, what von Hildebrand considers the theme of 
love—the apprehension of beauty is an essential element of our human experience of love.208 Von 
Hildebrand explains the intrinsic connection between our apprehension of the lover’s beauty, and 
“why beauty plays such a fundamental role in love.”209 This piece elaborates upon themes found in 
The Nature of Love; von Hildebrand dedicated the second chapter of Aesthetics to outlining “the quasi-
sacramental function of the visible and audible,”210 an idea that John F. and John Henry Crosby 
translates as “metaphysical beauty” [Sinneshonenheit]. He introduces his study with a word on the 
importance of spiritual beauty in Plato:  
This beauty is also expressed in the very important Greek word kalo-kagathon (the beautiful, 
the good, the perfect). In Plato and Plotinus, the superiority of the beauty of spiritual things 
to the beauty of the visible and the audible is emphasized, although both philosophers 
explicitly acknowledge the latter in its value (especially Plotinus in the ninth Ennead).211 
 
As regards the connection between love and beauty, von Hildebrand proposes that “Love responds 
to the overall beauty of the person who is loved.”212 He continues to explain: 
It is characteristic even of a purely natural love for a person, which is always love for the 
person as a whole, that it is a value-response to the beloved person’s overall beauty,213 
which also contains the reflection of all moral and spiritual values. How profound and 
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significant it is when Tristan, in his vision in the third act of Tristan und Isolde, cries out the 
ultimate word that sums up everything, the deepest word of love: “Isolde, how beautiful you 
are!” 
The theme of personalism is abundantly clear in this excerpt. What can a lover say when another 
asks: “Why do you love him?” Many lovers are left cold, speechless at the request to adequately put 
into words such a profound emotion. In love, we do not respond to merely “aesthetic particulars.” 
We are not moved by his face, we do not respond to her eyes. The apprehension of beauty in love is a 
response to the whole person. While it is clear that the particulars of the beloved may in fact be 
aesthetically pleasing, when we speak of “metaphysical beauty” [Sinneshonenheit], we are speaking of a 
certain form of beauty that is beyond the visible and audible, in von Hildebrand’s words. This is the 
type of beauty that one cannot perceive with the eyes or ears: we can be blind to the world, and still 
“see” the metaphysical beauty of another.  
Let us return for a moment to the theme of the irreducibility of the intentional act, in this 
case, the value-response that is love. When asked to capture the essence of one’s love for another 
person in the form of “reasons for love,” lovers are often rendered speechless. The irreducibility of 
beauty found in personalist thought is seen in “[t]he inability to indicate the reasons for loving 
someone.”214 The ineffable experience of love “only serves to point out the deeper and more 
individual value datum that we call the ‘overall beauty’ [Gestamtschonheit] of a person.”215 The 
ineffability of our love is not a sign of a lack of love, or an unfounded, irrational love of another. 
Quite the contrary: our love is as complex as the human person; to attempt to reduce it to a quality 
or a set of qualities is a disservice to the “essentially indescribable, inexhaustible” topic of love. If we 
attempt to attribute our love for another to, say, the beloved’s agility with words, once we find 
another person with a more developed poetic art, are we then justified in “leveling up” in our love? 
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Is it inevitable for us to fall in love with the better wordsmith, seeing as our love is founded upon 
our penchant for writers? Of course, the answer is no. This would betray the value-response to the 
beloved as a unique person. In the face of silence, “[w]e should not doubt that love is a value-
response simply because when asked why we love someone we cannot indicate the value qualities 
that motivate our love.”216 We do not love an amalgamation of a person’s characteristics; we love 
the person as a primary subject, irreducible to the particulars.   
There is an intimate relation between metaphysical beauty of the beloved and the theme of 
the value-response. To recognize the metaphysical beauty of the beloved is to address the subject’s 
being, to respond to the value of the beloved’s overall being. In The Art of Living, a work co-written 
by his wife Alice, von Hildebrand specifically addresses this lack of reverence for the metaphysical 
aspect of man. In a critique of the lack of reverence many exhibit—another example of seeing “from 
without”—von Hildebrand asks, “how little attention is paid to the person’s being, his kindness, 
generosity, humility, patience?”217 This theme of personal love—love for another person qua 
person—is exemplified in this excerpt from the aforementioned work: 
We are led to believe that success in life lies primarily in our being able to bring credentials, 
and yet, who would dream of saying to another person: “I love you because you are the most 
efficient secretary I have met in my life,” or because “you are the teacher who best organizes 
the material.” Love is not concerned with a person’s accomplishments, it is a response to a 
person’s being: this is why a typical word of love is to say: I love you, because you are as you 
are.218 
 
This is an example of personal love par excellence. Love is recognizing the beloved for himself, his 
intrinsic worth, his radical otherness. Perhaps von Hildebrand’s phenomenological “genius for 
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letting things be” ought to be applied to our approach of loving others. Perhaps the 
phenomenological attitude itself can lead to a more profound love, a deeper understanding of the 
other. Phenomenology uncovers things as they are; personal love loves “because you are as you are.” 
 
Beauty and Morality 
There is a profound interconnection between the morality of love and beauty. Von 
Hildebrand often equates love with the recognition of the intrinsic, the “metaphysical” beauty of 
another. The influence of virtue on beauty is a topic of much discussion in the works of von 
Hildebrand. The beauty of another person’s moral value “demands a value-response; and this is 
equally true of the ugliness of the moral disvalue.”219 His work outlines the theory behind a 
“spiritual beauty” that can be found in particular in the splendor of religious works of art. It is not 
something purely or simply aesthetic; it is a beauty that resonates beyond the merely visible or 
audible. Love engenders this metaphysical beauty in the beloved: 
Suppose we know someone who has never really loved and suddenly is seized by a great and 
deep love. Even in this case we can clearly see how much more beautiful he becomes, how 
liberated from the chains of comfort and routine, how much greater he becomes, how much 
less mediocre, how much more humble, more heroic.220 
 
Not only does love augment knowledge of the beloved, it augments the beloved himself. This leads 
to the uncovering, or the growth of our response to the metaphysical beauty of the beloved.  
Often the source of heightened creative imagination, love has the power to draw a person beyond 
that which he would normally be capable of achieving. It is the power in life that inspires 
transcendence, leading man to experience the sacred, and seek a reality that is beyond “the bonds of 
convention,” beyond the limits of what he formerly thought possible. In escaping the limitations of 
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the self, or at least seeking to move beyond them, love leads man to seek his “true self,” to seek a 
self that reaches a depth or magnitude that aspires to the heights of his love; this “true self breaks 
through in love; by loving and giving myself in love I am able to receive as a gift my better and more 
authentic self.”221 Von Hildebrand then ties in beauty with morality, such that love is an act that 
creates a sense of the beautiful: 
By loving I become more beautiful, and this precisely through the special commitment and 
self-gift which is proper to love, and also through a certain humility. In loving, I grow in 
humility because love is a gift and because I experience myself being “seized” by something 
that is greater than myself. Before I had relied on my own strength… but now all of this 
collapses when I love.222 
 
The idea that there is a fundamental connection between morality and beauty is a common theme in 
the work of von Hildebrand. This point made by von Hildebrand also points to the “economy” of 
love. In giving our self in love to another, we do not “lose” a part of ourselves in the exchange; 
rather, we become augmented by our love, by our very giving of self. This is why, when giving up 
our autonomy in love, we do not “lose” strength; we begin to find our strength in another. This 
points to the ultimate theme among the personalists in love, the theme of the “gift of self.” This gift, 
when bestowed properly, does not detract from our “supply” of love. When we allow our self—and 
what we may consider our ego-boundary,223 we begin to grow in love. Only through humility—one 
of both Scheler and von Hildebrand’s fundamental moral attitudes—can we begin to truly love 
another.    
 As regards the recurring notion of the fundamental attitude requisite of the lover, there are 
two basic elements that are requisite: 
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The attitude of love implies, as we know, two basic elements: the intention of union (intentio 
unionis) and the intention of well-wishing (intentio benevolentiae). In addition to these, there are many 
other elements to be found in love: the tone of inner suavity, the elements of fervor and 
audacity, and the act of a heroic self-abandonment.224 
 
Quite common in Christian conceptions of love is the idea that union and benevolence (willing the 
good for the other) are the primary or foundational elements of love.  While these are necessary of 
our loving attitude, they are not sufficient for our love. Since Aquinas, a common explanation of 
love has been a wishing the good for another person. This thesis, however, does not provide the 
complete picture of our phenomenological experience of love; hence, the Thomist approach to the 
love between man and woman is lacking in its explanation of the nature of love. Of course, the 
intent of unity and the intent of benevolence are valuable preconditions for a viable and happy love 
for another. It is my thesis that, however, the fundamental attitudes posited by both Scheler and von 
Hildebrand—namely, humility and reverence—are more phenomenologically relevant for an 
explanation of love’s nature.  
 The transfiguring effect of love that arises from a proper foundation in the human person is 
evident in the happiness of our love. The more reverent, humble, and self-aware we are as lovers, 
the more joyful and happy the interpenetration of selves. We become more open and receptive to 
the value of the other person qua person, and we are more able to enter into a personal communion 
with our beloved. Von Hildebrand speaks of love’s tangible effect on our being in relation to our 
loving attitude: 
The aspect of which meekness embodies a specific expression is that of a serene mellowness 
inherent in the perfect attitude of love: the softening quality of love by virtue of which it 
becomes, as it were, a tangible substance, which might be described as fluid goodness. 
Meekness is comparable to a seal which this element of love impresses on our whole 
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essence, thus conferring a specific stamp upon all forms of our communication and 
intercourse with other persons.225 
 
This “specific stamp” relates to the profound transfiguration of the self, the other, and the world 
around us through our loving experience. This mark of love points to the idea that persons can truly 
be known by their love.  
A final note on beauty that I wish to make is regarding the “theme” of beauty in the love of 
another person. Although von Hildebrand stresses the importance of our apprehension of the 
beauty, and our response to it in a normatively appropriate way, “this role that beauty plays in love, 
however, must not in any way be understood to mean that the beauty is the theme in love.”226 Von 
Hildebrand seeks to clarify the difference of “thematicity” between our response to persons in love, 
and our response to an object in recognition of its value: 
 There is a radical difference between the value-response of love to a person and the value-
response to a work of art, for in this latter case the beauty is indeed thematic. The beauty of 
the beloved person is as it were an irradiation of all his or her other values.  It is these (the 
moral, “intellectual,” and vital values of this person) that are the theme. The metaphysical 
beauty which is their irradiation does not interfere with the thematicity of these values; on 
the contrary, it gives them particular prominence.227 
 
Here, the language of Scheler is used to further the differentiation between the “moral,” 
“intellectual,” and “vital” categories of value. In reiterating this point, von Hildebrand seeks to 
clarify the appropriate order with which we should approach the value of metaphysical beauty in our 
meditation on love. As he explicitly states, beauty is an “irradiation of all his or her other values,” 
meaning that the root of love is the value of the beloved person, and the fruit of love is the beauty 
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that “irradiates” from the source of value. Metaphysical beauty is an accident of true value. The 
“theme” of love is the value to which we respond, not the beauty: 
Love would be undermined if one were to make the “glory” of the other values, the beauty 
that emanates from them, the theme. In addition, the love refers to this real individual 
person and embraces this person in his or her totality.  This is why one cannot take the same 
attitude to a beloved person that one takes to a work of art; such an attitude would be utterly 
incompatible with the essence of love.228 
 
While von Hildebrand greatly appreciates the value-responding power of a beautiful work of art, he 
in no way confuses the categories of beauty. The objects of our value-response—love of persons 
and appreciation of objects—are qualitatively different. Both “objects” may be objectively worthy of 
a value-response, however they are to be approached with a different level of sensitivity.  So far in 
our analysis of love’s primary characteristics, the themes of beauty and value have been explored. I 
will conclude this chapter by examining the character of love as a gift. 
The Gift of Love 
 
It was Shakespeare who wrote that “love sought is good, but given unsought is better.” This 
aphorism is rooted in truth; the phenomenology I have explored in this work affirms that essential 
to love is the element of the gift. However, many discussions on love involve distinctions in the 
characterization of love that involve a binary of “gift-love” and “need-love.”229 
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In speaking of love in the proper sense, that is, in the unified sense that I have attempted to 
describe in this work, there is no such thing as a “need love” that lies in opposition to a “gift love.” 
To pair “need” with genuine love, the nature of which I have outlined, is an inadequate, incorrect 
way of accounting for its nature. Love is radically opposed to “need.” For, if we grant that a 
characteristic of our love is need, one might then ask what “need” this love satisfies. Say, for 
example, one is wrought to love another out of a “need” for a partner in parenthood. It is common 
knowledge—backed also by biological and psychological studies on the matter—that it is natural for 
individuals, especially women, to experience at some point the “urge” for parenthood. Is the urge 
for motherhood a sufficient “reason” for loving another? When this need is satisfied, what becomes 
of our love?  
To characterize the nature of love as needful undermines the basic tenet of the recognition 
of personal value that founds and nourishes our love for others. When the need is satisfied, needs 
from parenthood to financial gain, the love loses its foundation. Other needs, both seen and 
unforeseen, may arise within the loving relationship that may become satisfied as a result of a 
requited love. However, to say that love is a satisfaction of one’s need or particular desire is not love 
proper—it is simply desire in the guise of “love.”230 Let us look for a moment at the possibility of 
love being founded upon a more basic and perhaps justified need. Perhaps our love is founded upon 
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a need for being loved and loving. If this is true, can need be a constituent factor, and the love 
sustain? 
Need love in this sense is, if anything, a psychological dependency on another person. Of 
course, this is not to say that humans don’t need love, and that to need love is a fundamental 
psychological flaw. This concept of “need-love” that some consider an actual category of love is at 
best a pseudo-love, and should instead be considered an improper attitude that leads one from true 
understanding of love and appreciation of the other qua person.  
I will conclude with the idea that persons are constituted by love—amo, ergo sum—and it 
follows from my premises that love is constituent for a fuller human experience, in a myriad of ways. 
That love is derived from a fundamental lack, from a need is not within the scope of a 
phenomenological account of love. Although we may be aware of the benefits of love, although we 
may think that we in fact need love for honest reasons, like the sharing of one’s self, be it in the form 
of shared resources or life-experience, we do not approach love from the standpoint of one in need. 
We seek the other’s love from the standpoint of the gift. In the next section, we will look at the 
effect of love’s gift, how it colors our perception of the other, and our experience of the world 
around us. 
The Overall Response to Value 
 
Love’s actuality brings one to a greater personal understanding of others, of themselves, of 
life. This discussion serves to illustrate von Hildebrand’s conception of love as a value-response. 
Our love for another human person is the highest response to value, the highest participation in the 
realm of values, for “love goes beyond all other value-responses in its response, that the ‘gift’ of love 
is greater than in any other value-response, and above all that it objectively surpasses the value of the 
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good that merits a response.”231 The essential aspect of love as a “gift of self” is represented in its 
(1) affirmation and “enthronement” of the beloved person, (2) the “credit” of love, and (3) the 
referent of love as an individual, unique person.232 These three aspects, when understood in light of 
von Hildebrand’s philosophy of the human person and the reality of the value-response, form an 
adequate defense of the claim of love as gift. In love we are inclined to “enthrone” the other, that is, 
to raise them above all others in our response to value. In this phenomenon of enthronement, “the 
other emerges from the sphere of indifference not only into the sphere of the precious, the valuable, 
the estimable, but also into the sphere of the enchanting and of the delightful [Beglückenden].”233 The 
other becomes a prominent one among many, is “declared to be precious in love.”234 A significant 
face, recognizably distinguished from a sea of indiscernible others, we imagine the other to be 
valuable above all other persons. In the enthronement, the beloved “is crowned” the “king” or 
“queen” of our heart,235 and directs our passions as we surrender to them our affectivity. How does 
this enthronement differ from respect, veneration, admiration, or any other response to value? 
Essentially, in love “the overall beauty of the other has to present itself to me if the response of love 
is to be awakened in me.”236 We find in love a qualitatively different response to value in that our 
heart is “conquered by another.”237 Our response to the other, in respect or reverence, is not in the 
same category of response as love.  
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The “credit of love” that we extend is the emphasis on the positive qualities of the other. It 
is a vision of the potentiality of the other, a discovering of the positive. Kierkegaard might consider 
this credit resulting from our presupposing love in the other, presupposing that the other is lovable, 
worthy of our love, and will be open to respond to our love. The credit of love implies that “love 
believes the best about the beloved person,” that love is slow to judge, a form of faith in the 
goodness of the other. This credit is exemplified in the instance of character judgment; “when I hear 
something negative told about him, I will not at first believe that it is true or at least not believe that 
it has been adequately interpreted.”238 This credit of love is, in essence, a statement of faith in the 
other. 
Furthermore, the profound effect that love has on the life of an individual is illustrated by 
von Hildebrand’s idea of love as a superactual response. By superactual, von Hildebrand intends to 
distinguish the effects of love from other temporary responses, such as the response to pain in one’s 
body as a result of physical injury.239 Such responses are responses that are “actualized from time to 
time,”240 as opposed to an enduring response that lasts over time. Love’s superactuality is 
experienced in the fact that 
The veneration which I have for someone does not cease to exist when I am taken up with 
other things; when I encounter this person it is identically the same veneration that is 
actualized again. It endures as a personal reality even if I am not actualizing it at the moment. 
It lives on superactually.241 
 
The difference between “actual” and “superactual” responses is a valuable contribution to the 
phenomenological account of love. The effects of love may not be felt as imminently superactual. 
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The fact that a commitment to love is made in a promise, the fact that you have shared, spoken a 
‘yes’ in love to another person colors your ultimate experience, regardless of the immediate “actual” 
feeling or effect of love’s gift. The response is felt in an overarching way, in a superactual way. Here 
we find an interrelation between the superactual response and the value response: 
Love for another person subsists as a full factor in my soul, coloring every other situation, 
deeply forming my life. It subsists not as any vague subconscious element, but as a 
meaningful response to the beloved person. It tends indeed to be actualized, but in its 
character of a meaningful response to the beloved it does not live only on its full 
actualizations.242 
 
Ever-present in our lives—whether hidden in potentiality or fully actualized—is our love for the 
other. This amorous intentionality indeed “colors” every situation, the other appearing under an 
aspect of our advance as lovers, our orientation as persons colored by our loving attitude. 
A unique point made by von Hildebrand is that prior to the marital vows, which are essential 
for the “gift” of love to become solidified, affirmed, and transcendent, a “spousal love” is already 
present between lovers.243 What this means is that marriage is a consecration of a love that is 
presupposed: two people can love like a married couple before the promise is made. This is a 
fascinating claim made by von Hildebrand, for he makes the bold declaration that spousal love 
can—and does necessarily—exist outside of marriage. The promise or gift of love espoused in the 
marital vow is an affirmation of a love that is already present. Therefore, two people can have shared 
the marital “gift of love” before the promise has been made. The commitment in its fullness should 
predate any “requirement” of commitment. The spousal love is a foretaste of marital love; the latter 
is an “eternal security” of the preexistent former.  
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Considering von Hildebrand’s work in light of personalist phenomenology, the act of love is 
inseparable from morality. To love is a moral act, hence Scheler’s tri-fold criterion of the lover of 
wisdom: the same can be said for the lover of another human person. The gift of self is “proper” to 
love, because love is to hold oneself accountable to moral preconditions. A relationship can be held 
to this criterion of love to be considered a relation that is conducive to love proper, or exhibits a kind 
of “pseudo-love” that von Hildebrand discusses throughout his work. Hence this is why von 
Hildebrand, Scheler, and many others consider love to be the fundamental act of persons. To 
become a human person in the truest sense, one transcends the self in the act of loving another. The 
goal of human existence is to—in humility, and with a sense of self-mastery (which is the normative 
criterion of a “gift of self)—overcome one’s self-centered and singular existence in order to reach 
out to his or her fellow persons. It is not enough for us to reach perfection in vacuo we must share 
our love, our happiness with others. Love is essentially a mutual activity. The goal of human 
creatures is not singular, but collective. It is not self-perfection in isolation; however, it is self-
perfection in a community, within a shared communal experience.  
When a relationship is founded with this tri-fold criterion—humility, self-mastery, and a 
fullness of love—the inclination toward moral betterment is inevitable in the communion of two 
persons in love. For Saint Augustine tells us, “Let the root of love be within, of this root can 
nothing spring but what is good.”244 A love in full light of recognition of the other is not an object 
in any sense of the word, but as a personal subject with a purity of heart—to will the good—is 
bound to prosper. This purity of heart is a fundamental aspect of love; it is our “reverent, humble, 
loving center”245 of human affectivity. This purity of heart leads to “a noble, great, and deep love 
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which is not bound up with any dark passion… the effect of this love is liberating and it challenges 
us to heroism, and does so without any threat of enslavement or any moral danger.”246 While 
passion in itself is not a detriment to human flourishing, there is a form of passion of both good and 
bad nature. The morality of passion is derived from the root of “noble, great, and deep love” that 
brings man outside of himself and leads him to strive toward a greater existence. A personalist 
philosopher par excellence, von Hildebrand writes in a way that fully integrates the value of the 
individual human person into his notion of love. I wish to extend this analysis of personalism in love 
with a discussion of the ordo amoris and its history, to see how the ordering of love is exemplified by 
Scheler and von Hildebrand.  
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What we love we shall grow to resemble. 
Bernard of Clairvaux  
 
Chapter Seven: The Ordo Amoris 
 
A Brief History 
 
 The theme of the ordo amoris dates back to the philosophy of Plato. In the Symposium, 
Diotima speaks of the nature of eros, and how it “recognizes a scale of beauty and of good.”247 As 
she narrates the movement of love, Socrates learns of the ascending order of love, a hierarchy 
naturally beginning with apprehending the beauty of the beloved, ending with the Beauty of form. 
The movement is an “ascent toward the things that are always, as opposed to those that come into 
being and pass away.”248 This idea of the “ladder of love” influenced the philosophy of Augustine 
and became manifest in his philosophy of the ordo amoris. Augustine contributes to this theme of 
love’s ascent a moral order. Rather than a descriptive ascent into the abstract world of forms 
proposed by Plato, Augustine outlines a normative ascent from earthly, temporal goods to heavenly, 
eternal ones. According to Augustine, the man living in accordance with the ordo amoris: 
Is a man of just and holy life who forms an unprejudiced estimate of things, and keeps his 
affections also under strict control, so that he neither loves what he ought not to love, nor 
fails to love what he ought to love, nor loves that more which ought to be loved less, nor  
loves that equally which ought to be loved less or more, nor loves that less or more which 
ought to be loved equally.249 
 
Essentially, Augustine instructs us to order our desire in accordance with the natural moral order. It 
seems that this normative order ought to be intuitive: while there is not a strict “list of loves,” 
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Augustine calls us to weigh our loves seriously, not only in accordance with that which is objectively 
good and desirable in the eyes of God, but to weigh our loves in reference to each other. Put simply, 
we ought to love finite goods less than infinite goods. We are to love every finite good less than God, 
even man. Our love for other persons is to be for the purpose of loving God; if we love others for 
themselves, we are essentially loving them too much. We are to love everything in God, especially 
other persons. Ultimately, we are to love God more than other persons, even more than ourselves.  
If we love inordinately, we do not love in accordance with the ordo amoris. Our lives become 
improperly ordered, and we are no longer on the pathway in alignment with the good.  
 In the Medieval Era, the Christian conception of an “ordering of love” is found within the 
thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Continuing with the Augustinian tradition of thought, “Thomas 
held that virtue is rightly ordered love: rightly ordered passions are good, and wrongly ordered 
passions are vicious.”250 Ultimately, the ordo amoris founds the relation between the self and the 
other in that “love is directed to someone else for the sake of the other's perfection.”251 Let us see 
how this Medieval conception of love’s order influenced the value-realist phenomenology of Scheler 
and von Hildebrand. 
The Ordo Amoris and Value Realism 
 
In the final chapter of his book, von Hildebrand discusses the ordo amoris—the order of 
love—in both a general and precise sense. We order our loves in terms of that which is more and 
less valuable. It is the substructure of morality that consists of the “hierarchy of morally relevant 
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goods,”252 or put simply, and order of lovable values. In what he considers a “general sense,” the 
ordo amoris: 
encompasses the entire order of preferring one thing to another, and it encompasses the 
obligation to do justice to the hierarchy of values in our response. In this general sense, it 
then implies the very general obligation to choose the higher good over the lower good in 
our actions, in our affective responses—in every kind of relating to things.253 
 
It is a consideration of love “analogously,” by which he means in a sense that is not in terms of the 
“precise,” “narrow” and “proper” way in which von Hildebrand considered it in the first thirteen 
chapters. In a footnote to this passage, von Hildebrand makes a distinction between his conception 
of the ordo amoris and that of Max Scheler. While Scheler thought that morality could be essentially 
reduced to the ordo amoris, von Hildebrand disagreed with a reduction of the sphere of morality to 
the ordo amoris. Von Hildebrand did not deny the merit of the ordo amoris and its role in the formation 
of man’s morality; however, he made it clear that his stance in no way mirrors that of Scheler’s. The 
primary focus of moral structure as centering upon the ordo amoris—the ordering of relevant 
goods—does a disservice to the independent value-response due of a particular moral good. The 
privilege of the merit of value is primary to but not necessarily independent of the ordo amoris:  
Of course, the morally relevant value must be apprehended in the rank that it occupies in the 
hierarchy of values and the value-response as an adequate response and does not necessarily 
involve consciously placing the morally relevant good above or below any other good. The 
call to give an adequate value-response issues primarily from the value of the good and not 
from the relation of the good to other goods.254 
 
The good is to be considered objectively and not solely or primarily in light of the other goods that 
take order around it. Von Hildebrand disagrees explicitly with Scheler in that “it is wrong to reduce 
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moral badness to choosing the lower over the higher good.”255 The choice to commit a morally bad 
act, or to align oneself with morally lesser good is not reducible to a simple “lesser than” mentality. 
Even a morally poor choice is to be considered in full light, and not in terms of that which could have 
been chosen as a lesser good, or as greater. To commit to this line of thinking would lessen the 
status of an intrinsically or irreducibly bad act, and miss the fullness of badness or goodness of a 
moral choice.  
 In his discussion of ordo amoris in the “more precise sense,” von Hildebrand specifies that in 
this sense, this order is the hierarchy of persons in our sphere of love. Here, he is not concerned 
with the ordo amoris as pointing to an abstract “good” that we are responding to, but rather, “with the 
question of which persons we should love more than others.”256 He applies this consideration to 
many loves, including the parental love of child, love of another friend, and the love of spouse. As 
regards each particular love, von Hildebrand provides an explanation for the theme of proper value-
response to each situation. What he does tell us is that love is a gift, a promise, a value-response. He 
imputes his concept of value-response to the “theme” of the ordering of love. When we consider 
the value of another, say, our beloved, “to the higher values ‘more’ of a value-response should be 
given. The higher good deserves more of a response than the lower good.”257 
The Movement of Love 
Much like Plato, Augustine, and Aquinas before him, Scheler alludes to the striving of man 
toward love, toward perfection through our loving of that which is good and noble for the spirit. A 
properly ordered love leads one beyond the self toward a higher expression of love, and a more 
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profound ethical understanding of others through loving. From the ordo amoris "emerge[s] the basic 
moral tenor of a person, the ethos of his community, and the norms to which he submits."258 This 
character of a “movement” is clear in Scheler’s work; “love is certainly a movement towards positive 
value, but so far as the nature of love is concerned it makes no difference whether this value exists or 
not.”259 Is Scheler, then, indifferent to the realm of values? As regards the nature of love, it seems 
that the advent of loving will continue whether or not the element of value is presupposed. If value 
is present, love seeks to enhance it; if value is absent, love seeks to discover it. 
Just as in the model of the human affective sphere as having an order of emotions, from 
lower to higher order, so does love contain a similar element of movement. For Scheler, “love is a 
movement, passing from a lower value to a higher one, in which the higher value of the object or 
person suddenly flashes upon us.”260 It seems, then, that one cannot “be in love” if one is not 
caught in a value-driven movement. This emphasis on value, prevalent in both Scheler and von 
Hildebrand, aids in distinguishing love in its pure sense from other forms of “pseudo-love,” including 
mere lust, desire, or attraction. According to Peter Spader, “it is because the movement of love is 
occurring that we can now see more clearly the higher values and their objective hierarchy.”261 So, 
for Scheler, the theme of love is a value-conscious movement that can occur in response to the 
value of another, or out of a spontaneous gesture from the self. This movement is akin to the 
philosophical task set by Scheler in his essay “The Nature of Philosophy,” in that he establishes two 
distinct facets of philosophy hearkening back to the Platonic tradition of philosophy: 
                                                     
258 Kelly, Material Ethics of Value: Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann, 44. 
259 Scheler, Nature of Sympathy, 141. 
260 Ibid., 152. 
261 Peter H. Spader, Scheler’s Ethical Personalism: Its Logic, Development, and Promise (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2002), 236. 
92 
 
1. An integral movement of the inmost personal Self, such as is not within the capacity of the 
common-sense outlook or of any cognitive desire which is founded therein. 
This is necessary even to bring the object of philosophy before the mind’s eye.262 
Further, this movement is founded in— 
2. An Act, which in essence is a love with a special character.263 
 
In the first point, Scheler points out that philosophy is separate from any “common-sense outlook,” 
incapable of a reductionist outlook on human nature. The pursuit of the philosopher is ontologically 
separate from the psychologist, biologist, or anthropologist. While other traditions deal with 
empirical ways of seeing, philosophy presupposes love in the character of the thinker. The primacy of 
love in human life arose “at the beginning of the Christian era,” and thus, since the coming of the 
Son of Man, “the primal Reality was, rightly or wrongly, thought and felt to consist in an endless 
activity of creative and merciful love.”264 To explore the nature of philosophy fully is beyond the 
scope of this work; however, a brief look into what Scheler and von Hildebrand consider the 
fundamental moral attitudes of philosophy can offer an insight into the moral attitudes of love. 
There is an integral connection between love and knowledge. Scheler adds that “love, which may be 
thought of as the heart and soul of the entire complex of acts, leads us in the direction of the 
absolute. It thus takes us beyond objects existing only relatively to our being.”265 Love leads us toward 
a sort of “ethical ascent,” in that we are drawn out of our subjectivity—our “Eigenleben” in von 
Hildebrand’s view—toward the other and ultimately to God. While in Plato’s ascent the absolute 
was a form (Love), in the ethico-religious Christian ascent of love—to use a term from 
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Kierkegaard—leads us beyond the self to communion with others and with God, the absolute love 
(agape). This so-called “Christian” ethico-religious ascent of love will be explored in the next section. 
As evidenced the prior discussion of his essay on the nature of philosophy, Scheler provides 
an outline of moral philosophy that grounds an intricate connection of the activity of love in man to 
the task of philosophy. It is from love that desire for knowledge arises; a desire that Scheler and von 
Hildebrand call the “philosophical eros.” This interconnection between love and philosophy, and the 
idea of love as an act central to man will contribute to Scheler’s foundational thesis that, above all 
other faculties—to reason, to choose, to doubt—man is a loving being. Through love, we are led to 
a full awareness of the objectivity of others and the world around us. In the next section, I will 
discuss the philosophical ascent of love since Plato to discover the intersection between the 
concepts of the Platonic and Christian ideas of love’s ascent. 
The Ascent of Love 
In Plato’s Symposium, the goddess Diotima instructs Socrates on the art of love. She speaks of 
an ascent of love that moves from the physical or temporal desire for the beauty of another person 
to the metaphysical or eternal desire for Beauty in its transcendent form. Of this Platonic ascent 
there are  “serious objections which are often raised against this concept: it is a love of ideals and 
not of persons and in the end it is a form of ‘spiritualized egocentrism.’”266 Furthermore, this critique 
points out that, “on Plato’s view we cannot love persons for their own sakes but only to the extent 
that they instantiate or realize ideals or contribute to the realization of ideals.”267 This platonic 
approach to love is radically antithetical to the personalist view of the lover seeking the other in love 
as ends in themselves. Rather than recognizing the irreducibility of the other, the platonic lover is 
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moved by a characteristic of the other—say, beauty in the physical (or metaphysical) sense—to 
further recognize and love the form of Beauty.  
This movement differs from the Platonic ascent, as Scheler’s account of love’s movement 
can be more accurately considered an “ethical ascent,” as his concern for the other is not superseded 
by greater values, like the form of Beauty or love itself.  Perhaps the underpinnings of this view can 
be found in each thinker’s ultimate telos of the community. For Plato, the highest of human strivings 
is a life of philosophical activity, the life of the intellect. The ideal community is ruled by 
philosophers—our leaders shall be rational thinkers, not affective lovers, he tells us. In fact, Plato 
privileges objects of love to subjects of love: “As objects of Platonic love (beautiful bodies or political 
programmes) all these are not only as good as persons, but distinctly better. Plato signifies their 
superiority by placing them in the higher reaches of that escalated figure that marks the lover’s 
progress, relegating love of persons to its lower levels.”268 The idea of a community comprised of 
“persons in love” is the ideal republic of Scheler. This idea will be imbedded throughout this work, 
and it will culminate in my thesis that, if Scheler considers the nature of love a movement, it differs 
radically from Plato’s ascent in which love aims beyond the other, upward from the particular to the 
universal realm of the abstract—toward beauty, goodness, and truth. The ascent of love in Scheler 
and von Hildebrand, however, is a personalist movement in full light of the other, moving upward 
not to the universal abstract, but ascending within our value-imbued world, and our shared world 
with the beloved, to the other in God.269 Ultimately, the ordo amoris is the order of love that, for 
both Scheler and von Hildebrand, points to objective value-laden reality outside our subjectivity. 
Through loving in light of the ordo amoris, which is ordered from the simple vital realm to the 
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complex spiritual realm of emotion, one comes to a full recognition of the beloved in light of their 
unique, radical otherness. 
Love as the Task of Philosophy 
 
When confronted with the question of the philosopher’s purpose, many respond with an 
etymological answer: the philosopher is a lover of wisdom. This statement derives from a blend of 
the Greek terms philo (love) and sophia (wisdom)—Philosophia. Traditionally, this is as far as 
philosophers have been willing to take the discussion of love’s connection to philosophy. Such an 
explanation, however, falls short of an adequate explanation to the philosopher. If philosophy 
historically began with “love” (philo), how does it relate to the nature of philosophy, if philosophy 
has since neglected its meaning? How is love and the pursuit of truth related? German poet Heinrich 
Heine waxed poetically: “The deepest truth blooms only from the deepest love.”270 Let us look at 
the intricate relation between love and philosophy to see how the personal motivation and 
preconditions for love may reflect the philosophical eros of lovers of wisdom. 
 The role of love for the philosopher has often been cast as eros, the ancient Greek word for 
desire, what is now considered to resonate more as an erotic love than a desiring faculty of the 
human person. Like love, the idea of the soul can be traced back to ancient times, the Platonic 
daimon, responsible for the “animating” feature of man—the soul—which is also considered the seat 
of eros, human desire. Max Scheler outlines the relation of love to the Platonic conception of the soul 
in his essay “The Nature of Philosophy.” Plato regards philosophy as an activity of the soul. The 
soul, according to Plato, is  
the dynamis at the centre of the Person, the mainspring, the Something which produces the 
soaring to the Real world, as the highest and purest form of what he calls eros—that is, as 
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what he was later to call…the indwelling tendency of all imperfect being towards perfect 
being.271  
 
Both Scheler and von Hildebrand, like Plato, presuppose a realist conception of reality, hence the 
emphasis on the desire to strive toward an absolute “perfect being.” Thus, the journey of the 
philosopher begins with a stirring at the innermost center of the self, the desire toward something 
higher, toward perfection. Tillich explains the relevance of Platonic eros in the discussion establishing 
love as an ontological category: 
Love, power, and justice are ever repeated subjects of ontology. There is hardly a leading 
philosopher who does not put them into the very foundations of his thought. In Plato we 
find the doctrine of eros as the power which drives to the union with the true and the good 
itself… In Aristotle we find the doctrine of the universal eros which drives everything 
towards the highest form, the pure actuality which world not as a cause (kinoumenon) but as 
the object of love (eromenon). And the movement he describes is a movement from the 
potential to the actual, from dynamis to energeia.272 
 
This philosophical eros, as von Hildebrand states, “is at its very heart a basic form of man’s natural 
longing for God, the absolute truth and the source of all truth.”273 Catholicism is the underlying 
influence beneath both Scheler’s and von Hildebrand’s philosophies; the neo-platonic influence of 
Augustine clearly informing their thoughts on philosophy. Therefore, rather than point to an 
abstract perfection, what they had in mind was the God of Christianity. The philosophical eros strives 
to unravel the truth of God, as all reality lays in Him. To understand this strikingly mystical 
description of the person in relation to wisdom, we must consider that phenomenology is, for 
Scheler, “an attitude of spiritual seeing...something which otherwise remains hidden.”274 This 
animating feature of man (the soul) is what forms the basic connection among men, and leads one 
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to seek ascending goals for the self, to move from a state of lesser perfection to higher. Scheler also 
draws upon the etymology of the tradition, as “the very name ‘Philosophy’, love of essential Reality, 
still bears the clear and ineffaceable stamp of Plato’s basic meaning.”275  
Philosophy, then, is a love that leads one to discover, or at least, to seek that which is 
essential to Reality. Such love is a distinct mark of what it means to be human; the human soul is 
equipped to discuss natures, to comprehend essences, to “love” reality in a way that animals (as far 
as we know) cannot. Von Hildebrand also differentiates philosophy from this so-called “common-
sense outlook,” which he considers as perceiving the object “from without.” He proposes that, 
rather than this viewpoint, philosophy deals with a seeing of objects “from within,” which Scheler 
references in his discussion of perceiving objects “before the mind’s eye.” The sciences cannot attain 
the insight that philosophy can through its intuitive insights. The pursuit of the philosopher is 
ontologically separate from the psychologist, biologist, or anthropologist. 
 While other traditions deal with empirical ways of seeing, philosophy presupposes love in 
the character of the thinker. Therefore, akin to the Aristotelian conception of eudaimonea as an 
activity of the soul, love is also a central act of man that founds philosophical activity. Scheler 
defines the nature of the philosophical attitude central to all thought in the tradition: “A love-
determined movement of the innermost personal Self of a finite being toward participation in the 
essential reality of all possibles.”276 This is a short but profoundly rich statement. By love-
determined movement, Scheler is referencing the philosophical eros, the desire for knowledge that 
moves our self toward a “higher” realm of truth. This “higher” realm is what Scheler means by 
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“essential reality.” He is admitting to philosophical realism in that there is a set truth, an “essential 
reality” that is beyond our merely subjective interpretation of it.  
If philosophy is a movement, when is the task as a philosopher finished? As soon as one has 
completed the task of loving, one may argue—philosophy, like love, is an act that never reaches 
completion. Perhaps, then, like the philosopher’s pursuit of wisdom, “Love can never be fulfilled… 
for love is always to come; love is always a task, something each individual must unremittingly strive 
to realize.”277 Finally, the activity of the philosopher is to be approached with triune orientation, or 
what I referred to earlier as the “moral attitude” of philosophy: 
1. The whole spiritual person must love absolute value and being; 
2. The natural self and ego must be humbled; 
3. Self-mastery must be achieved.278 
 
Scheler considers these three “moral acts” to lead, “in systematic interaction,” toward a full 
participation in the nature of reality. These acts of love, humility, and self-mastery are Scheler’s 
criterion of appropriate attempts to form an accurate mode of phenomenological seeing. This trifold 
criterion mirrors the thinking of von Hildebrand in much of his work when he writes of the moral 
attitudes. For von Hildebrand held the “conviction that certain realities, notably philosophical truths 
but also the beauty in great music and art [and persons], will only reveal themselves on the basis of 
what he called ‘fundamental moral attitudes’—reverence, humility, and love.”279 Although von 
Hildebrand does not write explicitly on this topic of “proper” phenomenological attitudes, he does 
warn us that, without a proper orientation toward knowledge, we will succumb to the “unfortunate 
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role that erroneous philosophical attitudes play in false common sense and inorganic reasoning 
about the world.”280  
It is on this point that I find an overlap between the seeking of metaphysical knowledge and 
the ethical formation of the philosopher. For (in phenomenology, at least) it takes fundamental 
moral attitudes to properly orient oneself toward the seeking of philosophical truth. It is only 
through humility, reverence, and love (the philosophical eros) that we are led toward higher 
knowledge, to the attainment of truth. Ultimately, both Scheler and von Hildebrand have formulated 
a phenomenology that places love at the center of man and at the “heart” of the philosophical task. 
What I aimed to outline is the intricate connection of the activity of love in man to the task of 
philosophy. This interconnection between love and philosophy illustrates the relevance of “love” as 
the philosophical eros to the task of philosophy. 
Loving and Being 
 
Thus far in this work, I have illustrated the concept of the human person and the 
phenomenological act of loving. As love is a spiritual act of the person, the interrelation between 
persons in love leads to a profound knowledge of the other qua person. We are constituted by a 
radically unique, irreducible personal center; “we live out of our personal center, we never lose 
ourselves in the beings with which we have to do; we remain intact as persons, standing in ourselves 
in relation to all other things.”281 We enter in communion with others and yet retain ourselves in 
the process; there can be no loss of self in the communion of love when our self is radically other 
from the beginning: 
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I and the other remain irreducibly two persons throughout the most heartfelt act of 
sympathizing with the other…it implies the irreducible two-ness of myself and the other. 
The same holds for love; it too is a properly personal act and so there can be no question of 
any amalgamation of two persons loving each other. Their irreducibility to each other, their 
inalienable two-ness is presupposed and in fact powerfully lived from within in all authentic 
love.282 
 
In love there is an interpenetration of selves that retains an “inalienable two-ness.” The individual 
person is irreducible qua person and qua lover. There can never be a collapse of the self in authentic 
love. “As the perceiver’s insight into the being of a person deepens,” our knowledge and our love 
“becomes more individual, more ineffable and at the same time more certain.”283 There is an 
interplay of knowledge and love in the spiritual act of love extended to another person. In the 
interpenetration of selves in love, the “person is present as loving, and where value is revealed as 
person…the structure of the correlation or dialogue is inexhaustible in its richness of meaning.”284  
Love leads one to discover new meaning in the other person. Love will, as Luther points out, 
reveal itself as a spontaneous, creative act in whose execution a person is most fully present 
and in whose movement other persons are discovered as persons, that is, in the full richness 
of their unique presence. The creative relational unity of persons in love will reveal a 
dynamic structure of Being.285 
 
Love is a creative drawing of the self, an awakening to the self and the other. To know, apprehend, 
experience another in a way that nears an adequate or meaningful relation is only achieved through 
love. The complexity of the human person demands a relation that is spiritual, hence the profoundly 
personal element of love. Returning to our epistemology of the heart:  
Scheler conceives of knowledge as an ontological relation of ‘participation’ in which a Being 
transcends itself to participate in the selfevident ‘whatness’ or ‘quiddity’ of another Being. 
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This self-transcendence in which a Being opens itself towards another Being in order to 
partake in its Being is what is called Love.286 
 
This transcendence of the self, this interpenetration of being is what Scheler and von Hildebrand 
consider precisely what love to be, on an ontological level. Retaining the concept of the person as a 
“mystery” is necessary in order to understand the essentially deep interpenetration of selves that is 
requisite of a phenomenological understanding of persons: 
One can say then, that the deeper one penetrates into human being, and Scheler will admit 
that such penetration is possible only in love, the more a human being appears, unique, 
irreplaceable, which is to say individuated. Scheler means that a human being is more 
individual, the more he is intimately personal.287 
 
There is no possible “objective” way of understanding love or persons, for love and human subjects 
are “mysteries” to be intuited, and not “problems” to be probed. To take a cold, distant, or 
eminently rational approach to a notion such as love or personhood is to overlook the existential 
import of such concerns. For Scheler, “[t]o reach another as a thinking being is not yet to reach him 
as a person. A person is not only one who thinks, but also one who wills, believes, feels, loves and 
so on.”288 Descartes was incorrect to reduce the human person to the ego cogito. To begin with the 
aforementioned approach is to begin with only a single facet of what it means to be human. The task 
of philosophy, much like the task of the lover, is to understand the object of our philosophical eros in 
the fullness of its mystery. And while person and love are mysteries that perhaps will never and can 
never be fully intuited, we will come closer by participating in such profound mysteries as 
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phenomenologically constituted persons, for “loving is incisively precise in its direct penetration to 
the core of being, where being opens itself in its full inexhaustible dynamic richness.”289 
 What, then, does a community of “persons in love” look like? In a communion of love are 
“all persons, human and divine, involved in a world, in the psycho-physical, in the personal.”290 
And this loving communion recognizes not just what is, but that which “is fundamentally 
unfinished,” for the task of person is a continual becoming. The invitation to a loving community 
“becomes an invitation or a task for man to become who he is, as he is and can be¸in this world with 
these persons.”291 That is the essence of love, an invitation to become what they are, to fully 
actualize their potentiality in the direction of the good, in a community of “persons in love.” 
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Let the root of love be within, of this root can nothing spring but what is good. 
Augustine 
 
Conclusion: The Meaning of Love 
  
Love’s presence seems to imbue all of human life with meaning. Love has the power to 
awaken us, to pull us beyond our mundane existence, to usher us on the path toward profound 
communion with others. For Marion, “if what I love is lacking, for me who loves, if therefore 
reciprocal polarization is suspended, even for an instant, even if for an innocuous motive, nothing 
less than the entire world is immediately and completely struck with vanity.”292 A love broken or 
unreciprocated can starve life of all meaning to the point of desperation, even death.  
With or without love, our world becomes transfigured. With the advent of love, we discover 
new value in others and in ourselves, and our life is imbued with new meaning. With the demise of 
love, we can be torn from this newfound reality, and even faced with the prospect of existential 
vanity. Whether we find or lose our love, the fact remains: we, the beloved, and our world are 
transfigured by our connection with value.  
I wish to return to the words of von Hildebrand, which I feel capture, in essence, the nature 
of the person’s love for another:  
Falling in love is essentially to be granted a vision of the beauty of another person’s 
individuality. This vision fills us with reverence, and simultaneously with a powerful 
attraction for the object whose beauty has been perceived. Literally, to love another person 
means to see his beauty, to discover the secret of his personality. This vision as we have 
called it, is so convincing that we say, “Never shall I forget it.”293 
 
The core of von Hildebrand’s philosophy of love, which encompasses his philosophy of the human 
person, is how we perceive the other. Love leads us toward humility in our openness and sensitivity 
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toward others. This vision of love reveals the beloved person in a new light. With this vision, we see 
this person’s “true face, his unique beauty: with the eyes of love, [we are] granted a ‘Tabor 
vision.’”294 This apprehension of beauty is not of any sort of material or empirically measurable 
observation. This vision is beyond the vital sphere of perception. The Tabor vision “from within” 
surpasses the scientific observation of the impersonal human body, which is, ultimately a seeing 
“from without.” The foundation of Scheler and von Hildebrand’s philosophy is a profound 
philosophical perception of the other—a view of the neighbor, or the romantic other with a spiritual 
sight grounded in love, an essential seeing “from within.” This love is for the other in full light of 
their intrinsic value, a value-response to their unique and unrepeatable self.  
 Love is a reverent appreciation of the other’s being as such, a response to the transcendent 
value of another person in terms of themselves as a thou, in full light of the other’s personhood. 
Love is “directed to the totality of the person loved.”295 This response to the other in “love is a self-
transcending value-response; I de-center myself towards the other when I seek out the beauty of the 
other and love her in virtue of her beauty.”296 This attitude of reverence is the cornerstone of one’s 
love for the other. This love involves the full self—the cognitive, affective, and volitional aspects of 
man—as knowledge, emotion, and will in coordination comprise the intentional act of loving.  
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Emotion belongs—passion, fear, hatred, and love—to the study of philosophy just as much 
as reason. A person feels as much as he thinks; it is argued that the basis of language itself came 
from the passions, from the drive toward human expression that became manifest long before the 
logical infrastructure of the spoken word.297 We may know causally the effect of this power 
constituent of love by its effects on our body and our psyche. Studies in neuroscience have shown 
us the human physiological response to others, the chemical response to “love” in the brain. 
However, the corporeal affect is not the sufficient cause of love. Even a full and complete 
identification of the physical reaction of attraction is not the final answer in our quest to know what 
the nature of love is. Love cannot be reduced to sensible or vital human feeling. Love’s effect is 
experienced cognitively, physically, emotionally, and spiritually. We must also consider love’s power 
teleologically, as love can imbue our lives with new meaning as a result of the theme of love: value. 
The relevance of love’s telos is correlative of the central theme of this work in placing the heart at the 
level of the mind and will. 
 Love is a dialectic between loving and knowing. We approach the other with a certain 
amount of knowledge, and an attitude oriented toward love, we seek to know and to love 
simultaneously. One cannot prioritize love over knowledge, nor can one prioritize knowledge over 
love. Our love of the other is an irreducible experience that, from the beginning, as Drummond tells us, 
involves concurrent cognitive and affective human faculties. 
 The element of willing, of commitment is the final point of difference between love and all 
other pseudo-forms of love, including attraction, lust, affection, and other feelings often mistaken 
for love in its true form. Through an understanding of the account of love posed in this work, the 
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various forms of pseudo-loves—what love is not—can be recognized. Furthermore, this analysis of 
love grounded a discussion of the difficulty in affirming the ontological reality of self-love. What is 
often confused as a “love” of self is perhaps best considered self-esteem, affirmation, or faith in 
oneself to become what we are. 
 One of the main themes of this work is the role of fundamental moral attitudes in both our 
life as moral agents and in our life as lovers. Repeatedly throughout this work and throughout each 
of their works respectively, Scheler and von Hildebrand discuss the importance of moral attitude as 
the foundation of everything from our approach to others to our approach to philosophy. Through 
cultivating such attitudes as reverence, humility, and love, we properly orient ourselves toward 
others, toward the task of philosophy, and toward the task of loving. It is my hope that philosophy 
moves away from biases inherited by our forefathers—from the Greeks to the Positivists—in order 
to reach a new level of understanding of the human person in light of our true self, comprised of 
emotion, will, and reason. Though a thorough understanding of love we come to realize how 
important it is to begin to understand ourselves and others, for it is “only though love [that] we can 
attain to the mystery of individuality in a person, that is, get a glimpse of the unrepeatable personal 
essence of a person.”298  
 Without love we can only grasp a person at the level of the essential; through love the other 
becomes fully revealed. Love heightens our receptivity to others and the world around us. We are, as 
with the philosophical eros, drawn out of our subjective existence (Eigenleben) and into an 
intersubjective dialectic of love with others and the world around us. Hence, the profound affect 
that the fundamental moral attitudes—especially love—has on us as both neighbors and 
philosophers. Through our love of the other, we are profoundly brought to recognize the individual 
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as worthy of being loved as a human person. This gift is the key that unlocks our innermost self and 
our fundamental task as human persons: to love others. 
Let us recall the task of love for both Scheler and von Hildebrand, of which “the essence of 
love as an edifying and uplifting [erbauende und aufbauende] action in and over the world.”299 Here we 
find a fundamental parallel between Scheler and Kierkegaard: love as an essentially edifying. Love is 
both an emotional response to another on the basis of value and an ethico-religious act of the will. 
We give ourselves to other, resulting in an edifying and uplifting mutual spiritual growth. In love, we 
are called to this uplifting task: “If I had loved as I should have loved, then I would have been co-
responsible for the growth in the power of another to love, and thus co-responsible for the greater 
love that he would have shown throughout his life in all of his relations with innumerable 
others.”300 The phenomenon of love, as I have shown, cannot be reserved for oneself. For love to 
be edifying, it must be a mutual, for-the-other, intentional act.  
It can be spoken of both metaphysically—an ontologically real phenomenon—and in the 
sense of an edifying task. Love is an enduring task, “always a dynamic becoming, a growing, a 
welling up of things in the direction of their archetype, which resides in God.”301 Through climbing 
the “ladder of love,” we ascend to new heights, recognizing the value of others as fundamentally 
lovable human persons. We become members of a loving community, of “persons in love,” as we 
participate in the world of values. We make ourselves a “gift” to others with full awareness of the 
fundamental moral attitudes—love, humility, reverence—and through our participation in this 
value-laden reality, we begin to truly understand ourselves and others as loving beings: amo, ergo sum. 
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